为何戴姆勒搞不定克莱斯勒 菲亚特却能带着它上市 (Why the Chrysler Fiat Listing is Able to Work)

Jiemian.com, October 12, 2014

菲亚特与其美国公司克莱斯勒合并的决议将生效。而10月13日全新的菲亚特克莱斯勒汽车公司FCA（Fiat Chrysler Automobiles）的股票将正式以FCA为代码在纽约证券交易所上市交易。

新的菲亚特克莱斯勒汽车公司也将继续扩大销售额，并寻找潜在的联盟机会。扩大菲亚特汽车在中国等市场的份额将是这一进程的下一个重大步骤。

合并后的菲亚特克莱斯勒成为世界第七大车企，并计划整顿老旧的工厂和产品线，希望在销量上更加接近日本丰田汽车，美国通用汽车和德国大众集团这三大巨头。

菲亚特克莱斯勒汽车公司CEO塞尔吉奥·马尔乔内说：“（合并后）将有空间塑造一家比现在的汽车业领导者丰田更大的车企。”计划在2018年退休的马尔乔内为菲亚特克莱斯勒制定了五年规划，到2018年时公司的销售量相比2013年应该增长60%至每年700万辆。而丰田、通用及大众三家公司2013年的全球销量均在900万辆以上。

重组专家企业阿历克斯合伙公司的欧洲主管斯泰法诺·阿维萨（Stefano Aversa）说，菲亚特和克莱斯勒的合并以及新公司在美国的上市让62岁的马尔乔内有更多筹码来出售非核心业务，或者是达成更多联盟。他表示，“我不认为马尔乔内制定的是一个单一策略，应该是根据市场状况以及企业表现来执行的多重战略。公司在美国的上市给了他很多选择，这本身就是极有价值的。”

现年38岁的菲亚特集团主席约翰·艾尔坎（John Elkann）支持马尔乔内的决定。他表示：“我并不打算出售菲亚特的股权，尽管菲亚特与其它企业的合并将会导致阿涅利家族所持有的集团股份遭到稀释，但这会使菲亚特变得更加强大。”Exor SpA持有菲亚特集团30%股权，是意大利知名的阿涅利家族（Agnelli）资产。该集团目前正由艾尔坎执掌。

菲亚特在7月以4.75%的利率出售了8.5亿欧元债券。国际策略和投资公司的股权研究员在这次发债之后称，“我们想知道一家美国公司通过美元计价发行债券的成本将可以低多少。”报告称，菲亚特的财务状况和信用评价都使得这个问题存在疑虑。

评级机构标准普尔在伦敦的企业信用评级董事阿莱克斯·赫伯特（Alex Herbert）说，纽约上市本身不会改变菲亚特的信用评价，更重要的问题是：菲亚特什么时候能够拿到克莱斯勒集团的现金。菲亚特克莱斯勒目前计划在2016年对克莱斯勒的债券进行再融资，有望通过这一操作完全掌控克莱斯勒的现金储备。这笔现金在6月底的时候已经达到133亿美元。

克莱斯勒是美国著名汽车公司，曾与通用、福特并称美国三大汽车公司。1998年，德国戴姆勒-奔驰汽车公司和克莱斯勒公司合并，是历史上汽车制造业最大的一起合并。戴姆勒-克莱斯勒公司成为当时全美第二大汽车生产商、世界第五大汽车公司。

2007年戴姆勒克莱斯勒公司宣称因止不住长期亏损将子公司克莱斯勒集团80.1%的股权出售给私人资本运营商Cerberus Capital Management L.P.。曾轰动一时的跨文化合并就此走到了尽头。2009年，克莱斯勒宣布破产，由美国政府和菲亚特共同接手。直至今年年初，菲亚特正式完成对克莱斯勒的并购，两家公司合并。

德国汽车界业内人士分析认为，梅塞德斯-奔驰与克莱斯勒的结合有先天的缺陷和后天的不足。由于欧美的文化差异，双方在管理方法和管理作风上截然不同；同时存在战略决策失误。根据美国人喜欢庞大舒适轿车的特点，克莱斯勒开发的皮卡车和SUV一度备受欢迎，而2005年石油价格增长令美国人环保意识加强，克莱斯勒的库存开始大量积压，公司不得不把产量削减，并关闭了克莱斯勒在美国的多家工厂。

前克莱斯勒东北亚负责人、高风咨询公司董事总经理Bill Russo对界面记者表示：“文化差异并不是戴姆勒克莱斯勒分家的关键原因。一家豪华汽车企业（戴姆勒奔驰）与一个大众品牌（克莱斯勒）合并在一起本身就阻碍了合并后协作效应产生作用。”

Bill Russo说：“戴姆勒克莱斯勒遇到的问题将不会在菲亚特克莱斯勒身上重演，两家公司都是大众品牌汽车公司，合并后将共享技术和生产平台从而增加产品的范围。管理层也更加具有对并购公司的管理经验。克莱斯勒将获得小型轿车的生产平台和零部件技术，特别是动力系统。而菲亚特也可以借此打入北美市场。”

一名与菲亚特克莱斯勒汽车公司关系密切的投资银行家说：“塞尔吉奥·马尔乔内非常迫切地希望菲亚特不再被视作一家意大利企业，他希望完全撤出意大利，但是他也知道这在政治上不可能。他能做的只是逐渐离开，这也是本次美国上市的主要意义。”

无论菲亚特还是克莱斯勒，进军中国时机都不算晚，但都以失败告终。马尔乔内也曾坦言：“菲亚特曾在中国市场存在决策错误。在当时，试图用落后的平台，落后的技术，落后的车型进入中国市场，我们当时完全没有了解中国消费者的预期和需求，也没有洞察中国市场和消费者的快速变化。”

菲亚特克莱斯勒合并后调整战略，重新进入中国市场。目前，菲亚特克莱斯勒与广汽集团合作，已经发布了菲翔、致悦等菲亚特品牌车辆，以及Jeep品牌车辆。今年菲亚特克莱斯勒在华销量也在持续增长，1至8月份，菲亚特克莱斯勒在华销量为9.82万辆汽车，与2013年同期相比攀升了55.7%。

China’s Latest Price Fixing Target

Reuters Newswires, August 18, 2014

Click here to see the video at AOL.com

China finds Mercedes-Benz guilty of price fixing

Reuters Newswires, August 18, 2014

Germany's Mercedes-Benz has been found guilty of manipulating prices for after-sales services in China, the official Xinhua news agency reported, adding to pressure on foreign carmakers in the world's largest auto market.

The report by the official Xinhua news agency made no mention of possible penalties, but China's 2008 anti-monopoly law allows the country's anti-trust regulator to impose fines of up to 10 percent of a company's China revenues for the previous year.

The Jiangsu Province Price Bureau, which launched an investigation last month, found evidence of anti-competitive practices after raiding Mercedes-Benz dealerships in the eastern coastal province and an office in neighboring Shanghai, Xinhua said.

The dealership in the same building as the Shanghai office which was raided appeared to be operating as normal on Monday (August 18), with potential customers peering at shiny new cars.

A Daimler spokesman repeated a statement, first made by Mercedes-Benz on August 5, that it was assisting the authorities with their investigation, adding that it was unable to comment further as it was still an on-going matter.

The Xinhua report said the cost of replacing all the spare parts in a Mercedes-Benz C-Class could be 12 times more than buying a new vehicle, citing a report from the China Automotive Maintenance and Repair Trade Association.

Managing director of Gao Feng advisory firm, Bill Russo, said the consumer would benefit.

"So I think what we are seeing is, first of all, a communication to the market that over the years, foreign branded products have been priced very high and informing the Chinese consumer that perhaps they should take another look at the prices and look for a more competitive price from the…and demand a more competitive price from the manufacturer. So in the end, this is actually a good thing for the consumer," he said.

An array of industries, from milk powder makers to electronics firms, have been coming under the spotlight in recent years as China intensifies its efforts to bring companies into compliance with the 2008 legislation.

The auto industry has been under particular scrutiny, with a wave of investigations prompting carmakers such as Mercedes-Benz, owned by Daimler, Volkswagen AG's Audi, and BMW to slash prices on spare parts in recent weeks.

"So by enforcing these laws, they are actually making the foreign branded products more affordable to the market, which in the end is going to make harder for Chinese branded car makers to compete against them. So the unintended consequence is that you're giving the consumers a better price but you are also forcing the local car makers to compete with foreign branded products that are more affordable," Russo added.

Early this month authorities said they would punish Audi and Fiat SpA's Chrysler for monopoly practices.

Chinese media reported last week that Audi, the best selling foreign premium car brand in China, would be fined around 250 million yuan ($40.7 million).

Click here to read the original article

Peugeot agrees main terms of tie-up with China’s Dongfeng

The Financial Times, December 11, 2013

• 1810: The Peugeot family business begins to put down its engineering roots as brothers Jean-Pierre Peugeot II and Jean-Frédéric turn their father’s grain mill into a steel foundry, making everything from coffee grinders to umbrella frames
• 1882: The company turns to transport, making bicycles. The first was Armand Peugeot’s ‘Le Grand Bi’, or penny farthing bike
• 1893: The Peugeot Type 5, which was powered by a two-horsepower engine, was produced from 1893 to 1896
• 1913: The Peugeot 153, whose 2.6-litre, four-cylinder engine produced 12 horsepower, was made in various forms until 1925
• 1929: Peugeot unveils its first mass-produced car, the 201, but sales were are hit by the Depression
• 1934: The top-of-the-range Peugeot 601 rolled off production lines in 1934
• 1940: After the Peugeot 402, produced from 1935 to 1942, the company is forced to build cars and weapons for the German war effort
• 1962: The stylish Peugeot 404 cabriolet became a 1960s icon
• 2010: Peugeot starts production of the fully electric iOn city car
• Today: Robert Peugeot is chairman of FFP, an investment company through which the Peugeot family controls a 25 per cent stake in the car company ©Reuters

PSA Peugeot Citroën and China’s state-owned carmaker Dongfeng Motor have agreed the main terms of an industrial and commercial partnership that will include a large capital injection into the French group in return for technology sharing.

The two carmakers are still hammering out the details but the agreement is expected to involve a €3bn-€4bn capital raising by Peugeot and an agreement for the two groups jointly to develop and produce low-cost small cars for southeast Asian markets.

Peugeot hopes to be able to have the deal announced in the first quarter of next year, according to two people briefed on the discussions.

The French group is desperate to lower its over-dependence on the moribund European car market and is rapidly burning through its capital reserves. Both Peugeot and Dongfeng declined to comment.

Peugeot closed down the first large car factory in France for 30 years this year and reduced its workforce as it seeks to reduce the €3bn cash burn it suffered in the full year 2012. It recently hired a former Renault executive to lead a more globalised push.

The company already has a successful joint venture with Dongfeng building cars in China, but trails rivals such as Fiat and Volkswagen in markets such as South America, and Renault-Nissan in tapping growth in southeast Asian markets.

Carmakers have increasingly turned to alliances and joint ventures to increase their scale and cost efficiencies, but a deal between Peugeot and General Motors to share some products and suppliers has failed to live up to the French carmaker’s hopes.

There are expected to be 5.5m cars and light vehicles sold in southeast Asia this year, roughly half the size of western Europe. But the region’s market is expected to grow by more than half by the end of the decade, versus flat or marginal growth in Europe.

Negotiations are continuing between Dongfeng and Peugeot about exactly how much the Chinese group will pay for what percentage of Peugeot.

The people briefed on the discussions, who declined to be named as the talks were private, added that it could still all fall apart, although this was looking less and less likely.

The French state is contemplating matching any investment made by the Chinese group to maintain French influence over the company.

The most likely investment by Dongfeng and the French state would give the Chinese carmaker and Paris 17.6 per cent each, according to research by Macquarie, with the Peugeot family holding 16.5 per cent and GM 4.5 per cent.

An injection of that size would result in the Peugeot family losing control of the business it founded in 1882.

Based in Wuhan, in central China, Dongfeng is one of China’s largest car manufacturers with annual revenues of $63bn. It already operates a manufacturing joint venture with Peugeot alongside three others – Honda, Kia and Nissan – and last week signed a fifth joint venture agreement with Peugeot’s French rival Renault.

If completed and approved by Beijing, Dongfeng’s tie-up with Peugeot could catapult it on to the global stage – something that no Chinese state-owned carmaker has yet been able to achieve. Hangzhou-based Geely, which purchased Volvo Cars from Ford in 2010, is privately owned.

“Whatever they pay for the shareholding, they’re probably going to get justification in knowhow,” said Bill Russo, a Beijing-based automotive consultant. “Peugeot’s global distribution capacity would also be an advantage for Dongfeng.”

Peugeot accounts for 60 per cent of France’s car production and employs close to 100,000 people locally.

Additional reporting by Tom Mitchell in Beijing

Competing in the China Truck Market - Policy & Regulatory Outlook

February 5, 2013

by Bill Russo

This is the third installment in a series on the China Commercial Vehicles market.  

Click here to read the first installment.

Click here to read the second installment.

Government policy plays leading role in driving the development and eventual consolidation of China’s auto industry. According to the Plan on Adjusting and Revitalizing the Auto Industry promulgated in the early of 2009, “capable Chinese players are encouraged to grow stronger by M&A and restructure”. 

The plan outlines an intention to consolidate the industry into 2 distinct “tiers”:  the Tier 1 group consisting of companies with an annual capacity of 2 million units that are encouraged to acquire smaller automotive companies throughout China, whereas Tier 2 consists of companies with an annual capacity of 1 million units are encouraged to drive regional consolidation. 

The plan even names four tier 1 companies as well as four tier 2 companies:

• TIER 1: 
• Shanghai Automotive Industrial Corp (SAIC)
• First Auto Works (FAW) Group
• Dongfeng Motors (DFM)
• Chang’An Automotive

• TIER 2
• Beijing Automotive Industrial Corp (BAIC)
• Guangzhou Automotive Industrial Group (GAIG)
• Chery Automobile
• China National Heavy Duty Truck Corp (CNHTC)

The top 3 HDT manufacturers including FAW, DFM and CNHTC are among the Tier 1 and 2 OEM groups named within this consolidation plan, and are therefore likely to receive extra funding and policy support from the central government when acquiring smaller companies.

Responding to the government policy indication, leading auto groups are actively establishing their growth strategies and seeking to build scale advantage.  Among them FAW, DFM, BAIC, SAIC, and CNHTC are more likely to be acquirers in industry consolidation among the HDT/MDT players.

The early stages of industry consolidation have already begun.  Starting from its acquisition of Nanjing Auto Group in 2007, SAIC has expanded their production bases from Shanghai to Yizheng and Nanjing in Jiangsu province.  FAW is negotiating with Brilliance on business restructuring and acquisition.  If the deal is done, FAW will grow larger than SAIC in terms of scale.  After acquiring Changhe and Hafei, the Chang’An Automotive group possesses nine manufacturing bases across the country.  The company also stated their plans to merge two to three domestic vehicle companies and one parts company within their next 5-year plan.

To defend themselves and avoid being acquired, smaller commercial vehicle companies like JAC, Beiben and others are actively expanding their business coverage, developing special sectors, and establishing product technology cooperation.

For global truck manufacturers, the consolidation of the China auto industry implies that a more structured and disciplined market will eventually emerge which will increase the efficiency, scale and R&D capabilities of the remaining competitors.  Leading Chinese OEMs will seek to expand their ownership of assets and capabilities needed to compete in an increasingly global business. 

Chinese OEMs must therefore move up the value chain to deliver products with competitive technology to address a growing demand generated for world-class quality trucks.  To achieve this, they will undoubtedly allocate larger investments into product development, enabling better responsiveness to the market.  Further, the industry will require better IP protection and enforcement to facilitate technology sharing with international players.

Though industry consolidation will likely be a central theme in the next decade, there are several other policy and regulatory trends that pose challenges to the global truck manufacturers in China.  

First, the China government is closing the gate for international newcomers by raising the entry barrier for new project approval.  Automotive industry policy makers have strong concerns with overcapacity risks in the China auto industry.  These concerns are having an impact on their willingness to consider new vehicle manufacturing projects including HDT.  Therefore, Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) released the Admission Management Rule for Commercial Vehicle Enterprises and Products, which took effect from January 1^st, 2011, requiring all truck manufacturers to strictly follow current investment and capacity utilization requirements. Despite this, other very challenging policy objectives must also be met, including the upgrading of the technology used in the local brands, new energy vehicle development and export promotion.  Global manufacturers who are willing to share critical technology and capabilities with their Chinese partner may be able to successfully receive approval for their new manufacturing project in China.

Second, although Chinese policy makers stress their serious attention to the subject, Intellectual Property (IP) protection is an area of great uncertainty for global manufacturers.  Global vehicle manufacturers are pushed to transfer their leading technologies in a market where the legislation and law enforcement for IP rights violations is far from sufficient.  Many IP related lawsuits claimed by international manufacturers in China have not been met with satisfactory results, such as BMW’s compliant for Hubei Shuanghuan’s styling imitation of X5, Fiat’s claim for Great Wall’s copy of Panda, as well as GM’s claim for Chery’s copy of the Chevrolet Spark.  Such issues also extend into areas of technology and other transfer of capabilities.  Learning from past experiences, many international manufacturers have taken both technical and commercial measures to protect their IP when cooperating with Chinese partners.  For instance, a modular sourcing strategy from Tier 1 suppliers can be employed (instead of sourcing individual component through the Joint Venture) has become a common practice to protect IPR of the multinational partner.

Third, global truck manufacturers will increasingly face China unique standards, which are influenced by the local players.  Global truck manufacturers who have made significant commitments to the market often feel like a “guest in their own house” when doing business in China.  For instance, the delay of Euro 4 gives local MDT/HDT manufacturers more time to develop their technology, as they retain their enormous cost-advantage compared to foreign high-end OEMs. Similar advantage for Local MDT/HDT manufacturers is the current end-of-life regulation, which requires scrapping after 600,000 km. Such developments might be influenced by politics.  To mitigate risk of such unfavorable standard, global truck manufacturers have to make proactive efforts in involving and lobbying the organizations that develop regulations. The resources and experience of the Chinese partner in dealing with the policy-makers are also essential to be leveraged to address this challenge.

Finally, global truck manufacturers will be exposed to legal compliance risks when working with their Chinese joint venture or affiliated company.  In spite of measures taken to address the problem, bribery and other corrupt business practices are common in China.  Several years ago, individuals within the Daimler Truck division were implicated in an anti-bribery case in China.  Daimler was required to pay as much as USD $185Mn for reconciliation, and the company has been compelled to reinforce corporate compliance in every process of the business operation.  Corrective actions such as establishment of a regional compliance office, compliance-related business processes, mandatory compliance training, and a hotline to report violations of compliance behavior have turned out to be highly effective in mitigating the compliance risk for Daimler in China.