Showing posts with label FAW. Show all posts
Showing posts with label FAW. Show all posts

2.23.2015

Competing in the China Truck Market

Gao Feng Insights Report, February 2015
We are pleased to share with you a report titled: Competing in the China Truck Market.
While global brands have enjoyed success in China’s passenger vehicle market, the same cannot be said for the commercial vehicle market. This segment has been dominated by local Chinese manufacturers who have relied on sales to local buyers seeking low-priced equipment. However, we anticipate that several factors will be reshaping the market and competitive landscape in the commercial truck sector, creating a “window of opportunity” in China for participation in what has historically been a predominantly local market.
We believe that market conditions and regulatory challenges will create a need within China’s truck industry to form alliances with foreign partners to secure capabilities which are lacking in the commercial vehicle sector in China. China’s truck manufacturers will need to upgrade their technology to meet demanding new regulations, and will need to improve their service and distribution business practices as the market matures. The changing mix of products towards a higher concentration of line-haul HT, along with anticipated policy changes brought about from China’s intention to reform its State-Owned Enterprises, are driving forces which will alter the landscape of competition in the commercial truck sector.
We welcome your comments and feedback on our report or in general about our firm.  We would be glad to meet you in person to share our data and perspectives in a fuller manner.  Please let us know if you are interested in meeting and discussing directly how we can help you to operationalize these insights.
Thought leadership is core to what Gao Feng does.  We will, from time to time, share with you our latest thinking on business and management, especially as it relates to China and China’s role in the world.
In this paper, we offer our “deeply rooted in China” perspective to the analysis of the impact of each of these developments.
Best Regards,
Dr. Edward Tse
CEO, Gao Feng Advisory Company
edward.tse@gaofengadv.com
Bill Russo
Managing Director, Gao Feng Advisory Company
bill.russo@gaofengadv.com
Tel: +86 10 8557 0676 (Beijing); +852 2588 3554 (Hong Kong); +86 21 5117 5853 (Shanghai)
Gao Feng website: www.gaofengadv.com

2.16.2014

Chinese manufacturers should behave like an American in Europe

China Automotive Review, November 2013

Extracted quote from Bill Russo:

The current perception of Chinese buyers is that Chinese manufacturers produce low cost and inferior cars compared to the joint ventures. Pursuing a multiple brand strategy is not going to change this especially when there is little difference in quality between the brands. “A multi-brand strategy requires a much higher cost structure to create and market a portfolio of uniquely branded offerings,” warns Bill Russo, president and CEO of Synergistics Ltd., a Beijing-based automotive consultancy. This money would ultimately be better spent on R&D to produce a smaller range of better quality vehicles that are not solely competitive on price and that have a definite design architecture. 


Full posting of this article is not allowed by the journal.  

Making it big: large cars and government procurement

China Automotive Review, October, 2013

Extracted quotes from Bill Russo:


“When China regulates it does so in regard to the stage of its industry and with a certain set of outcomes in mind,” says Bill Russo, president and CEO of Synergistics Ltd., a Beijing-based automotive consultancy.  Both FAW (Hongqi) and SAIC (Roewe) have a history of providing government cars. Hongqi dates back to 1958 and was used for high ranking government officials until they switched to favouring foreign cars. SAIC built the Phoenix and later the Shanghai SH760 for officials not important enough for a Hongqi.

It is also going to be difficult to persuade officials to drive domestic cars if they are perceived to be inferior. “The existing government fleet can hardly be downgraded,” says Russo.

Sales of these large cars so far have not lived up to expectation. Last year the Roewe 950 sold 4,905 compared to 86,101 for the Buick LaCrosse, on which it is based. “It isn’t about just having a product that meets the specifications but the esteem this class of buyer aspires to have,” says Russo.

Full posting of this article is not allowed by the journal.  

12.17.2013

Car sales rev up to double speed in China

The Financial Times, December 15, 2013

After an uncharacteristic deceleration in 2012, the world’s largest car market is again growing at a double-digit clip, writes Tom Mitchell in Beijing.

LMC Automotive, a consultancy, estimates that sales of passenger vehicles in China from January to September increased 15 per cent to almost 12m units. That compares with expected growth of less than 8 per cent in the US for 2013, and projected year-on-year declines in Brazil, Russia, India, Germany and Japan.

China’s four richest urban centres seem to be overwhelmed with traffic congestion and related pollution issues.

But Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou and Shenzhen are just at the point where car ownership traditionally begins to take off – when per capita GDP reaches $10,000. According to Synergistics, another automotive consultancy, that figure in China’s “big four” regional car markets now stands at more than $12,700.

Moreover, manufacturers are turning their attention to the smaller cities where more than 80 per cent of the country’s 1.3bn people live and per capita gross domestic product is about $4,000.

“Congestion and pollution issues might have a negative effect [on growth in China’s largest cities], but [smaller cities] still have a lot of potential,” says Ray Bierzynski, executive vice-president of General Motor’s joint venture with SAIC Motor and Wuling Auto in Guangxi province. “Our expansion has got to be in those areas.”

In volume terms, GM is the second most successful multinational car company operating in China. Its joint ventures with SAIC, First Auto Works and Wuling sold 1.1m passenger vehicles over the first three quarters of this year, compared with Volkswagen’s 1.9m.

Analysts attribute GM’s and VW’s success in China to aggressive localisation of production, research and development – a tactic that automakers at the luxury end of the spectrum are also adopting.

Daimler formally opened an engine plant in Beijing in November – its first outside Germany – that will eventually export components to Europe.


Yet China has yet to emerge as a significant automotive exporter as Japan and Korea did before it, especially to the US and Europe. Over the first eight months of this year, China’s vehicle exports fell three per cent over the same period in 2012 to just 500,000 units.

11.28.2013

Great wall of China: Why Indian companies grapple to operate there

The Economic Times of India, November 28, 2013


It was a big reason why Apollo Tyres made the bold move this July to acquire American company Cooper Tire—an operation twice its size—and now it's a reason why it is looking to renegotiate or break that agreement: China. It's the world's largest market. It's also a market with rules and a mind of its own. Apollo is finding that out: workers of Cooper's Chinese subsidiary have slammed the deal, saying it does not comply with the country's laws, and its Chinese partner has offered a buyout.

Three others from the broad Indian auto sector who ventured into China in the past decade— Sundram Fasteners, Mahindra & Mahindra and Bharat Forge—have found out the hard way. Each is struggling to scale up and become relevant. "The China tractor acquisition was part of our growth plan to get a foothold into the world's second-largest tractor market," says Pawan Goenka, ED and president, Mahindra & Mahindra. "We could not have ignored our presence there."

But China, where the state is never far away, is not falling over itself to have Indian companies. Li Jia of IHS, a research firm in China, says Indian companies don't offer anything unique. "New entrants need to show their clients reasons to buy their product, which can be based on lower price, superior technology, better quality, etc," she says. Indian companies, she adds, have neither the brand pull of American and European companies, nor the immaculate cost management of Chinese companies.

Global auto majors started entering China in 1984, when it opened its auto sector. According to Synergistics, a China-based auto consultancy, only four JVs have disbanded, while 23 survive. Bill Russo, president of Synergistics, says China caps a foreign company's share in new auto JVs at 50%, but places no such restrictions on component ventures.

Indian companies have tried operating in this framework, but have faced a perception bias, cultural and integration issues, and lack of skilled labour. "Indian companies have been unable to build scale, and being over-calculative has left them with lower profits," says VG Ramakrishnan, MD of Frost & Sullivan, a consultancy. "They would rather invest in Latin America and Southeast Asia." China remains a long haul.

Mahindra & Mahindra

When Mahindra & Mahindra made its two drives into China, first in 2004 and then in 2009, it entered a market that was large but also incredibly crowded, with about 200 manufacturers rubbing tyres. Its first acquisition was that of Jiangling Tractors, a maker of low-horsepower tractors (18-33 hp).

M&M's plan was to ship Jiangling's low hp tractors to India and use China to develop business in Europe, US and Australia. But the low hp tractors did not take off in India and the Chinese market started shifting to higher hp tractors.

"Despite M&M's long-term commitment in China, there seems to be a management reluctance to go for the big investment," says Mahantesh Sabarad, senior analyst at Fortune Financials.
India Inc’s acquisition drives into China grapple with severe operating challenges

China, in tractors, has several common aggregate manufacturers, who are akin to contract manufacturers. Many have scale and are used by tractor companies to source aggregates (like engines, hydraulics and axles). "It is difficult to differentiate your product from that of a relatively small manufacturer," says Ruzbeh Irani, CEO of international operations at M&M.

Complicating this is the regulatory landscape. Agriculture in China is subsidy driven and influences tractor economics. In 2012, crop prices were lower, so were subsidies. Tractor companies had to resort to discounting, reducing profitability.
"The tractor utilisation window is also very short, given the cold climate in most of the country, especially the north," adds Irani. "Coping with the strain on the system in season time was a challenge."

The Huanghai Jinma brand—manufactured by the Mahindra Yueda JV, its second and bigger venture in China—is well known and sold through a network of 250 dealers. M&M is pulling levers: a new and more modern plant, improving quality, and new and more powerful tractors.

Going forward, M&M plans to strengthen its 100 hp-plus range and invest more in R&D. It even plans to import its Arjun range from India, something that Irani is looking forward to. "We will also be looking at the possibility of localising the tractor, with Chinese aggregates and components, as also with our own Chinaproduced engine," he says. Meanwhile, both ventures are making losses.

Bharat Forge

Bharat Forge's entry into China was part of a new strategy it unravelled for itself between 2004 and 2005. This saw the world's second-largest manufacturer of forging products spend $140 million to buy auto-component companies in Germany, Sweden, Scotland and the US, and form a joint venture in China with one of the nine state-owned groups there.

The essence of that strategy, termed 'dual shoring' by Bharat Forge chairman Baba Kalyani, was to establish manufacturing beachheads close to customer facilities to minimise risk of supply disruption and win larger contracts.

In this new scheme of things, China, a large auto market and fast becoming a magnet for global auto majors, was crucial.

The Bharat Forge management saw China, along with India, as a low-cost production base. However, its Chinese joint venture, with the FAW Corporation, has been struggling to deal with the pull back in demand, first that happened in the wake of the 2008-09 global financial crisis and, more recently, in China itself.

While Kalyani did not reply to an email questionnaire for this story, a senior company official who spoke on the condition of anonymity, says FAW Bharat Forging, in calendar 2012, has been affected by the fall in the commercial vehicle and construction markets in China.
India Inc’s acquisition drives into China grapple with severe operating challenges

Mahantesh Sabarad, senior analyst at Fortune Financials, a brokerage, says officials of the Indian company have told him that, because of the language barrier, they are unable to convey ideas to Chinese executives in the joint venture and implement strategies for growth.

By itself, FAW Corporation has good pedigree in China, partly because of its state lineage. It makes cars, trucks, buses and auto parts. It has JVs with Toyota, Vokswagen,General Motors and Mazda, among others. While that state connection can be an asset, it can also be a liability, says Sabarad.

Companies doing business with Chinese state-owned enterprises, he adds, must come to terms with their interests and priorities, which are heavily shaped by policy directives and are intuitively resistant to organisational changes. Many among the senior management are more 'state cadres' than professional executives.

"While there was a clear improvement opportunity for the JV, there was also a significant resistance to implementation," says Sabarad. "The excess manpower issue also could not be resolved."

Sundram Fasteners

Sundram Fasteners was one of the earliest Indian entrants into China, in 2003, when the world was feeling the first stirrings of the next economic powerhouse.

Back then, Sundram invested $13 million to set up a plant to manufacture high-tensile fasteners and bearings. This unit delivered revenues of Rs 97 crore in 2012—or 3.7% of the company's consolidated revenues of Rs 2,651 crore in 2012-13— and Rs 93 crore profits.

Those are small pickings and Sundram has no major capital expenditure plans in the near future. "While we had a firstmover advantage, China is a slow innings for us. And we are okay with it," says Arundathi Krishna, deputy managing director of the company. "China is a test match for us and not a 20:20."

Sundram drove into China with a threephase strategy in mind. The first was to tap China's capabilities as a low-cost manufacturing base, and export products to its existing global customers. The second was to start supplying to global auto majors for their units in China. And the third was to supply to Chinese auto companies.
India Inc’s acquisition drives into China grapple with severe operating challenges

According to Arundathi Krishna, the company has broken ground in the first two sets and it is now focusing on the third. "It's challenging as these companies generally like to buy from Chinese suppliers," she says. Adds Suresh Krishna, chairman: "This is taking a little longer than expected as customers are not readily known to us. It will take some marketing effort before successful penetration can occur."

The promoters say their current investment is in line with demand, and that they don't want to over-invest and then wait for orders. "Because of the global recession, there is a slowdown in the Chinese economy. But we are confident it is a passing phase," says Suresh Krishna. "For now, the profitability is adequate and we are sanguine that it will continue to grow."

10.15.2013

"Competing in the China Truck Market" rated Most Popular Article in CHINAtalk

CHINAtalk, October, 2013 edition

The following recognition was received for Bill Russo's series of articles on the China truck market in the recent edition of GlobalAutoIndustry.com's CHINAtalk newsletter:

MOST POPULAR ARTICLES FROM SEPTEMBER EDITION
Competing in the China Truck Market: Leveraging China for the World
We are in the midst of an economic revolution: a shift of the global center of gravity of economic strength towards the east, which is fundamentally reshaping the competitive landscape of numerous industries.  As an economic bellwether, the ...  Read on...
1st installment:   An Introduction

2nd installment:  The Competitive Landscape

3rd installment:   Policy and Regulatory Outlook

4th installment:   Implications for Multi-National Corporations

5th installment:   Winning in China's Mid-Market


Click here to read the article in the September edition of CHINAtalk

9.16.2013

Volkswagen opens plant in Chinese province of Xinjiang

wsws.org, September 16, 2013

An extract from the article:
Pointing to the signs of slowing economic development, industry analysts like Bill Russo, director of the Beijing Synergistics consultancy firm and a former Chrysler manager, warned of “high levels of excess capacity” and “considerable pressure on profit margins” in the Chinese auto industry.

Read the full article at wsws.org

7.26.2013

China's Great Wall Motor Is Built on SUVs

Bloomberg Business Week, July 25, 2013




Wang Jiangwei spent last summer sweating through a month of military drills—everything from marathon runs to rigorous calisthenics—conducted by Chinese People’s Liberation Army instructors. But Wang isn’t a soldier; he’s a researcher at Great Wall Motor (2333:HK). The training program is a creation of Great Wall’s quirky founder, Chairman Wei Jianjun, who has built China’s biggest maker of SUVs with a leadership style that stands out for its emphasis on discipline and frugality usually more common to the military.

Chairman Wei JianjunCourtesy Great Wall MotorsChairman Wei Jianjun
Training isn’t the only area where Great Wall marches to a different drummer. Big Chinese rivals such as FAW Group and SAIC Motor (600104:CH) often team up with foreign automakers, including Volkswagen (VOW:GR) and General Motors (GM), tailoring their models to affluent Chinese drivers’ taste. But under Wei, Great Wall has mostly developed homegrown products on its own aimed at China’s masses. That allows it to operate without splitting profits or enduring the extra bureaucracy of joint ventures.

The go-it-alone strategy has worked handsomely for Great Wall’s investors: Its stock has surged more than sixtyfold since a low in 2008. That runup has made Wei the wealthiest car executive in Asia, with a fortune of $6.5 billion and a grand plan to create China’s first global automotive brand. “I don’t pay much attention to share prices,” says Wei. “I care more about the real business.”

Car experts take the entrepreneur seriously. “If there are one or two automakers able to survive all the competition with foreign rivals in the next decades or so, Great Wall will definitely be one of them,” says Bill Russo, formerly vice president of Chrysler Northeast Asia and now president of automotive consultant Synergistics in Beijing. He says the company could become the next Hyundai Motor, which has grown from a modest maker of cheap cars into a full-line global manufacturer.

Wei has begun bolstering Great Wall’s research capability to develop the sophisticated engine and propulsion components he’ll need to become a player outside China. He wants to double sales to 1.3 million vehicles by 2015. His longer-term goal: to outsell Chrysler Group’s Jeep brand globally.

Great Wall lacks the revenue heft of many major rivals because its cars are far cheaper: Its Haval H5 SUV costs 92,800 yuan ($15,124), a fourth the cost of an Audi (NSU:GR) Q5 built in China. But the SUV specialist’s low costs—in part because of cheaper plant equipment and minimal research and development in the past—have given it rich operating margins that beat even lucrative outfits such as Fiat’s (F:IM) Ferrari sports car unit. Great Wall will probably lead all automakers’ margins globally this year, at 16.4 percent, says Max Warburton, an analyst at Sanford C. Bernstein (AB).

The company’s net income had been expected to rise 24 percent, to 7 billion yuan, this year after surging 66 percent in 2012, according to an average of 16 analyst estimates compiled by Bloomberg. But the company on July 23 told Hong Kong’s stock exchange that net profit for the first half of 2013 rose 73 percent on strong sales and expanding margins.

Wei, born in Baoding in 1964, says he was greatly influenced by his father, an artillery soldier who went on to make boilers. After several factory jobs, Wei took over a small car-modification business at age 26 and turned it into a van maker. He shifted focus to pickup trucks after seeing their popularity in Thailand. Small business owners and farmers favored Great Wall’s Deer, making it China’s most popular pickup by 1998. Then antipollution laws limited truck use in major cities, prompting Wei to switch to SUVs. Today, SUVs make up nearly half of Great Wall’s sales—and for the 11th year it’s poised to lead China’s crowded SUV market, its auto industry’s fastest-growing segment.

Russo recalls that during a trip Wei made to Chrysler’s headquarters in 2008, he was asked by Thomas LaSorda, then Chrysler’s chief executive officer, why Great Wall didn’t join Chinese carmakers in showcasing vehicles at the Detroit auto show. Wei replied the company wasn’t ready, Russo says. “They don’t try to overreach,” he says.

Wang Fengying, Wei’s top sales chief since he recruited her in 1991, is further evidence of Great Wall’s unconventionality. Both her age—she wasn’t yet 21 then—and gender were unusual for a Chinese manager. Wang, now 42, says she doesn’t shy away from telling her boss he’s wrong. “We argue all the time,” Wang says. “Our goals are the same, so we can always find common ground.”

Wang says five years ago she opposed the rollout of the Gwperi subcompact endorsed by Wei. He overruled her—only to see the car flop after buyers found it too small and pricey. The debacle is engraved in red on Great Wall’s two “Boulders of Shame” in Baoding; one lists major product failures, and the other identifies four officials who’ve been jailed for accepting bribes.

Wei has other eccentricities, according to Zhang Yun, an outsider who’s advised him for five years on marketing. The billionaire is so frugal he smokes 10-yuan-a-pack Zhongnanhai cigarettes. He once scolded some dealers for leaving too much food after a meal. He sleeps most nights in a room next to his office.

Then there’s Wei’s discipline. Rather than the touchy-feely leadership exercises espoused by some management gurus, Great Wall makes recruits and those receiving promotions endure marching drills, push-ups, and hours standing together in the hot sun. The idea is to build endurance, increase willpower, and develop the team spirit that compels employees to push harder for the company’s success. “I have gone to other factories in China, and when it’s time for lunch everybody runs to the cafeteria at the same time,” says Russo. “They don’t do that at Great Wall.”

Chinese carmakers are a decade away from delivering their first globally competitive vehicle, Warburton says, but that’s only one or two product cycles in the auto industry. Great Wall’s H5 drives well, he says, yet suffers from “truly awful” vibrations in its gearbox and poor braking. But the newer H6 model shows a “massive leap forward” in quality, according to Warburton.

Wei acknowledges that Great Wall’s ability to develop better, and likely pricier, technology will determine its future. “We have to own core technologies and make breakthroughs,” he says. “The biggest risk we’re facing is possible complacency.”

The bottom line: Great Wall Motor, China’s No. 1 SUV maker, has operating margins of 16 percent. That’s the highest of any carmaker.

With Michael Wei

Click here to read the article at businessweek.com

5.06.2013

Competing in the China Truck Market - Leveraging China for the World

by Bill Russo

This is the sixth and final installment in a series on the China Commercial Vehicles market.  


Click here to read the first installment.


Click here to read the second installment.


Click here to read the third installment.


Click here to read the fourth installment.


Click here to read the fifth installment.


We are in the midst of an economic revolution: a shift of the global center of gravity of economic strength towards the east, which is fundamentally reshaping the competitive landscape of numerous industries.  As an economic bellwether, the automotive industry is of great importance to this rebalancing of economic power.   The changes that result from the restructuring underway in the automotive sector are fundamental and irreversible.

After an unprecedented period of economic expansion, the Chinese government began taking measures to shift the economy to a more stable and sustainable pattern going forward.  China is likely to manage the risks associated with this transition with little disruption to the world, the environment, and the fabric of its own society.

By 2020, we anticipate that the commercial HD/MD trucks install base will increase by almost 7 million units to 10.7 million and annual sales will rise to 1.7 million – representing 43% of the global truck market.  With anticipated growth in export sales of Chinese-assembled trucks, it is easy to see how the Chinese market will be the most important market in the world.

It is becoming increasingly urgent for global truck manufacturers to get in the game in China.   The local players will increasingly influence regulatory policies and standards, making it more difficult to enter and compete in the market in the future.   The delay of Euro 4 gives local MDV/HDV manufactures more time to develop their technology, as they retain their enormous cost-advantage compared to European and Japanese high-end OEMs.

While it is legitimate to question whether Chinese companies can assume a leadership role in the transformation of the global commercial truck industry, one simply cannot deny the influence that China has had on industry developments.  The sheer size and growth of the China market will require multinationals to consider reprioritization of their capital plans and resource allocation.   The reallocation of production and supply resources to China has fundamentally changed the cost structure of many industries – which changes the entire competitive pricing game.  China’s government policies and centrally planned economy have supported the creation of the infrastructure needed to stimulate both the supply and demand side of the auto business.

Already, low-cost “good-enough” quality Chinese companies are about to change the global competitive landscape with products that are relevant to the high-growth global emerging markets.  As China automotive players begin to consolidate, they will increase their efficiency, scale and R&D capabilities – making them even more competitive in the future.

Global manufacturers will increasingly be pushed into the luxury “niche”, unless they adjust their business model and develop low-price, as opposed to low-cost products, which are not just “good enough”, but have the right features, durability, more rapid innovation, and lower price to be sold globally.  The Chinese market is already highly fragmented, and the pathway to entry for foreign players is not obvious.  However, we believe that several market entry options exist as previously noted.  MAN’s JV with Sinotruk may be able to crack open the mid-range market in which local OEMs are dominant.

A catalyst is defined as “a person or thing that precipitates an event”.  This is an appropriate characterization of China’s role in the transformation of the global auto industry.  In a globalized world, we will likely find that the transformation of the automotive business model may not be linked to any one company or country.  Instead, leading 21st century companies will be the ones that can quickly adapt to the reality of globalization.

The emergence of China as the largest automobile market in the world is a significant event only in the sense that it causes the entire world to take notice of just how fast this economy is developing – and to also understand precisely how China is transforming the global auto industry.  Rather than trying in vain to turn the clock back to the way things used to be, it would be wise to learn how to use these transformational forces to define a business model to leverage the capabilities which globalization makes possible.


4.21.2013

Chinese Vehicle Market Slow to Turn Green

Wards Auto, April 19, 2013

by David Green


Chinese policy makers appear to be favoring hybrid vehicles with subsidies.




BEIJING – With the dust now settled from last month’s handover of power in Beijing, policymakers responsible for China’s auto sector seem to be favoring hybrids as a step toward expanding green-vehicle use.

The initial stage of the push to promote so-called new-energy vehicles, and with them a differentiated technology standard that China can export, now is widely acknowledged to have failed, at least regarding promoting sales of battery-electric vehicles.

Axel Krieger, analyst at management consultancy McKinsey’s office in Beijing, tells WardsAuto: “The frustration is that the policy is unclear, there are hardly any EVs to buy, the infrastructure is not there and there are disparate local solutions for local OEMs.”

Data from the China Association of Automobile Manufacturers (CAAM) shows only 12,791 new-energy vehicles were sold in China last year, the vast majority to government projects.

A little more than half were passenger vehicles (public buses accounting for most of the remainder), and these were spread across a range of domestic suppliers, with Chery’s QQ3 electric vehicle the top performer with 3,129 deliveries.

Industry sales primarily were EVs, but including a handful of hybrid-electric, plug-in hybrid-electric, solar, fuel cell, natural-gas hybrid and liquefied-petroleum-gas-fueled vehicles.

This is far from the government’s interim target of having 500,000 green vehicles on the roads by the end of 2015, let alone its projection for 5 million by 2020.

These frustrations were voiced by Beijing Automotive Group Chairman Xu Heyi, who told a press conference in mid-March that government sales accounted for almost all his state-owned company’s 2012 sales of 1,000 alternatively powered vehicles.

This is because of an underdeveloped recharging infrastructure: Beijing has just 47 EV charging stations, compared with 67 in Geely’s headquarters city of Hangzhou.

And while Industry Minister Miao Wei last month affirmed the government’s intention to continue encouraging green-vehicle sales though consumer and producer financial support for another three years, more flexibility is planned, including more subsidies for hybrids.

Notably, a new tier system will base subsidies not on vehicle type but on its energy-saving potential. One plan stipulates offering RMB3,000 ($483) per kilowatt-hour capacity of an auto battery, which can cover hybrids as well as EVs.


A 3-year trial program that expired in December provided a subsidy of RMB60,000 ($9,500) for the purchase of EVs and RMB50,000 ($8,060) for plug-in hybrids. Hybrid electrics were eligible to receive just RMB3,000, but the new subsidy framework removes the restrictive focus on EVs, to which the domestic industry so far has failed to respond.

“A shift is now taking place whereby the government is moving towards encouraging hybrid vehicles as a stepping stone to increasing the number of cleaner vehicles,” IHS Automotive analyst Namrita Chow says.

Industry-watchers say the central government’s promotion of hybrids could favor foreign auto makers and joint ventures, given their superior quality, reliability and warranty protection.

“I think global players like Toyota will benefit the most,” says Boni Sa, IHS Automotive’s China light-vehicle production manager. “Even if the government subsidizes hybrid vehicles in China, the hybrid cars will still be more expensive than the conventional models for both global and domestic” brands.

The FAW-Toyota JV is developing a hybrid version of the Corolla, Sales Manager Zhang Sijun says, and will increase investment in other hybrid models going forward. A BMW China spokesman confirms new-energy vehicles will be the focus of a forthcoming JV brand under the German auto maker’s existing arrangement with Brilliance Auto.

Another potential weakness in the revamped green-vehicle policy is the ability of local and city governments to have different policies, which might discourage the development of vehicles that are salable elsewhere in China or abroad.

Even as industry minister Miao was announcing the central government’s new subsidy program, officials in Tianjin, Shenzhen and Guangzhou were issuing details of their own, unrelated policies to stimulate local investment, prompting Yesheng Ji, deputy secretary-general of CAAM, to warn against such local protectionism.

“The pilot allows for multiple solutions to coexist. Different companies and local governments have different approaches – there’s no consistency,” says Bill Russo, a Booz & Co. senior advisor who cites BYD’s partnership with multinational ABB Group to develop charging infrastructure in Shenzhen as an example.

Wang Binggang, chief consultant to the Chinese government’s push to promote new-energy vehicles under the 11th Five-Year plan, wants the new subsidies extended throughout the green-vehicle chain, from auto makers to charging stations and upstream parts-replacement facilities.

Whether the new program adopts this kind of structured approach, even offering electricity tax concessions to users of EV charging stations, will go a long way toward determining its success, he says.

“The difficulty with reform in China is that the local regions can do a lot of stuff out of sight,” says Greg Anderson, principal at Pacific Rim Advisors. “They have been hammering on about auto industry consolidation, but that has not happened. There are new firms springing up all the time, because local governments are incentivized by economic growth.

“That’s how the (Chinese Communist) Party is built, and until those political and structural issues are taken care of, there is little chance of progress.”

Yet, Anderson also offers a note of cautious optimism. “(Premier) Li Keqiang is a trained economist – he gets this. There’s been a change at the top, there is the possibility of change, but we don’t know how effective it will be for years,” he tells WardsAuto.

Russo expects immediate progress in green-vehicle sales to public-transportation operators, including taxis. This could lead to more government vehicles going electric, although issues including public sanitation and postal service must be addressed before top officials abandon their premium black-tinted-window Audis.

Indeed, Anderson suggests: “People want to buy the most car they can that impresses their friends. It’s just not fashionable to drive a car that’s seen as environmentally friendly.”

Click here to read this article at WardsAuto.com



2.28.2013

Competing in the China Truck Market - Implications for Multi-National Corporations

March 1, 2013


by Bill Russo

This is the fourth installment in a series on the China Commercial Vehicles market.  


Click here to read the first installment.


Click here to read the second installment.


Click here to read the third installment.


China’s market size has been hyped to the point of cliché since the country first opened its doors to foreign investment.  By 2020, the China HD/MD truck market is expected to reach 1.7 million units sold per year.  As noted in an earlier article in this series, products positioned in the in the price range between 200K – 350K RMB account for 70% of total sales.  The companies positioned to sell to this rapidly expanding “mid-market” segment aim to address the needs of domestic customers looking for goods and services that offer “good enough” quality and value for the money. 

Sandwiched between the premium market and the bottom of the pyramid, lies the rapidly expanding global middle market --  a segment of business and retail customers that is rapidly gaining buying power, especially in emerging markets.  The middle market offers more than incremental customers and profits – it is a key competitive battleground. The winners here will likely be the leading companies of tomorrow.

Beneath the veneer of many middle market strategies ostensibly focused on incremental growth, the emerging markets are incubators for a wave of local companies that are trying to climb up the product-price pyramid to eventually emerge as global competitors.

Whatever the motivation for pursuing mid-market strategies with an increasingly global scope, the elements of offense and defense have become equal in importance.  In the spirit of the Innovator’s Dilemma, written and popularized by Harvard’s Clayton M. Christenson[1], companies are adopting the mantra, ‘if I don’t do it to myself, someone else will do it to me.’  The dilemma of introducing fit-for-purpose, but lower priced products in the home markets of multi-national corporations has challenged the conventional business logic of pursuing projects with ever-higher return on investment.  However, succeeding in the rapidly expanding mid-market will certainly trump having an emerging-market competitor do it before you.

Mid-market form

The underlying reason for the emergence of mid-market players in China is the nature of the country’s economic growth. For many industries, China’s product market segmentation has become very diverse, typically far more than MNCs’ home countries.  In many countries, the market pyramid has a small top wedge, a modest middle slice and large base.  But in some others, the lower tier is smaller, the top is growing but still relatively small, and much of the expansion is coming in a bulging middle.  Whatever its size, this middle tier is the natural home base for many of the best Chinese companies. Here is where they find the opportunities best aligned with their strengths.

However, of most importance is that while winning in the mid-market will determine the fate of many companies within China, China’s mid-market impact will be felt far beyond the country’s borders, as some of the more prescient multinational companies have started to realize.  The Chinese companies emerging in this space will gain access to enormous scale advantages. Any profits they make will be reinvested, allowing them to move both up the value chain, and eventually out of the country to the international markets.

Breeding ground

The importance of China’s mid-market stems from the fact that this is where Chinese companies are establishing themselves. China’s domestic HD/MD manufacturers already command more than 90% share of the market for commercial trucks, and virtually all of the low-end market.  Having locked in this business, market leaders including CNHTC, FAW, DFM, BAIC and SAIC are in the process of acquiring capabilities that allow them to address the expanding mid-market.  Developing a highly adaptive and good-enough mid-market product offering is the pathway for such companies to win in China as well as expand beyond China.

They know they cannot enter at the top end of the market for most goods – in almost every industry; their products are not good enough to take on multinationals head-to-head.  They also know that while the bottom tier is perhaps their most natural home, such is the rate of China’s economic growth that this segment – however big it may be today – can only shrink, and at a rapid rate, over the next few years. Companies that want to grow must therefore address the middle tiers.

This is where their range of advantages can be brought to bear. Domestic businesses have – and will continue to have – privileged access to this tier. Not only will they be better positioned to offer strong value propositions, but they will also be better prepared to overcome the structural impediments that will prevent the rapid adoption of global business models in sectors such as construction and agriculture.

The size and diversity of China has created very complex market segmentation.  Regions are developing at different rates, with differing amounts of access to other markets both within the country and overseas. While this diversity will not last for ever, the transition stage the country has already entered will persist for many years to come – far longer than in other emerging markets, such as those of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan.  Here they will be able to temper themselves and build scale.

The major new companies that emerge from this breeding ground – some private, others state-owned – will be some of the most disruptive forces in Chinese business. Subject to intense competition from other mid-market firms, and selling to customers who themselves are constrained by competition, these businesses are both frugal and focused. From their mid-market bases, the best of them can build scale, add capabilities, and start to encroach on turf that multinationals have long regarded as their own.

For local players in the emerging markets, a mid-market strategy can be quite challenging, since local brands frequently incur greater pricing risk when delivering higher contented products into the market.  This is for a couple of reasons.  First, when the local product’s brand image does not naturally carry the price points required to support feature-rich products, these products are at risk of having to be discounted. Second, local companies are typically less accustomed to managing the complexity entailed in feature rich products, introducing the risks of cost-creep.  Overcoming such challenges is key to the development of the next generation of global competitors.

Many Multinationals assume that they just have to hold on until the Chinese market is mature enough to afford their products. But by that time these mid-market innovators will have built long-lasting relationships with their Chinese clients, and will have narrowed the gap between themselves and their global competitors.   Sany, who became the world-largest concrete pump manufacturer and who has recently acquired the second largest producer (Germany’s Putzmeister), is an example of this new breed of global players.





[1] Clayton M. Christenson, The Innovator’s Dilemma (Harper Business: 1997)