全球汽车论坛举行 中国因素关乎世界汽车业发展

China News, October 25, 2013

　　这是中国汽车业界高水平的论坛，政府、行业、企业代表层次颇高，热点话题层出不穷。政府部门的相关人士在论坛上表示：“随着越来越多国内企业走出国门，合资公司股比放开的问题也会提上议事日程”。在中国整车制造生产领域，外资持股比例不得超过50%，一直是政策的“红线”。虽然争议不断，但在近年来却持续升温。此次论坛，这个话题再一次成为了焦点之一，而且响应者有所增加。——编者

　　10月17日至18日，第四届全球汽车论坛在武汉成功举行。与会嘉宾紧紧围绕“汽车未来发展之路——目标·策略·模式”的主题展开精彩对话和研讨。

　　今年，中国汽车产销有望突破2000万辆大关，继续领跑全球汽车市场。但是，全球汽车产业共同面临诸多挑战，包括环境、油耗、能源、安全与交通管理等等问题，能否提出可行的、创新性的解决方案，已成为关乎汽车产业发展及汽车企业生存的关键因素。因此，政策制定者、重要的行业机构、汽车制造商、供应商、销售商和所有相关方之间的协同合作也正在变得更为重要。

　　全球汽车论坛组委会执行主席、中国国际贸易促进委员会汽车行业委员会会长王侠在开幕式致辞中说：“作为全球人口最多、新车需求量最大、汽车产业发展增长最快的国家，中国汽车产业在成为全球汽车产业发展引擎的时候，所面临的巨大挑战和深层次问题也应该引起全球的关注，因为这些问题的解决不仅关乎中国汽车产业的发展，也关乎世界汽车产业的发展。”

　　本田技研工业株式会社会长池史彦对于中国汽车工业的发展寄予厚望。他认为，面对来自于能源、环境的挑战，重要的是中国应该引领全球汽车行业的方向。而这样一个正确的方向和节奏，可以更好地为世界带来利益，而且重要的并不仅仅是提高销量，而是质量、安全以及环保，这样才能够更好地实现全球竞争，支持全球的市场更好地接受中国制造的汽车。

　　但事实上，中国要引领全球汽车的方向，要解决的问题还有很多。中国机械工业联合会会长王瑞祥指出，和世界发达国家相比，中国在自主创新、核心零部件和品牌打造等方面还存在着较大的差距。“要真正建设汽车工业强国，我们还有很长的路要走。”王瑞祥说。

　　美国博斯公司（Booz&Company）高级专家，Synergistics有限公司创始人、总裁BillRusso也指出，现在中国汽车市场仍然非常分散，自主品牌竞争非常激烈。所以，中国的汽车格局还是分而治之，没有凝聚力，而且本土的内部市场就是竞争非常的激烈。这个竞争层次还需要提升。

　　作为全球第一大汽车市场和生产国，未来中国能否引领全球汽车行业的方向？东风汽车公司总经理朱福寿提出：面对战略机遇期，中国汽车产业如何实现持续、健康发展，必须解决三个矛盾点：合资品牌与自主品牌在中国市场同台竞争、长期对峙的矛盾；中国企业走进国际市场的坚定决心与国际贸易壁垒的矛盾；汽车刚性需求与能源、交通、环境保护的矛盾。

　　广汽集团总经理曾庆洪的建议是：第一，加快自主创新能力的提升，特别是关键零部件与关键核心技术的突破；第二，加快整合重组；第三，加快经济结构调整，特别是产业布局调整。而四个跨越包括：从制造到创造的转型升级、生产基地向产业基地的跨越、从资产经营向资本经营的跨越、从经营产品到经营品牌的跨越。

　　江铃集团董事长王锡高则认为，为提高我国自主品牌汽车企业的自主研发能力，在引进国外先进生产技术时通过吸收、模仿、改进，逐步实现技术科研开发的成熟化，最终达到能够自主创新的目的。在这个环节中，改进是关键，不能一味地模仿外国的技术，而应该在学习的同时找出一条适合中国市场和国际市场实际需要的道路。

　　观致汽车董事长兼首席执行官郭谦表示，中国汽车发展经历了几个阶段，首先是能够掌握一些关键技术，或者是一个车身，一个变速器；其次，能掌握车的整合；第三，产品的平台化、模块化；第四构建品牌特征。在这方面，观致汽车已经打造了一个高起点的汽车，成为一种观致新模式。

　　福特汽车公司总裁兼首席执行官AlanMulally则给出了一个可持续的技术路线图：柴油以及汽油在内的传统内燃机及材料的改善，空气动力学以及电子设备等等的改善和系统的整合以及技术的连接性，汽车未来会变成一个可移动的设备，让人们可以连接到互联网，混合动力到纯电动车的发展。“在整个过程当中，需要协同合作，让全球各地的政府和企业一起来建设基础设施，这样才能够把这些成熟的技术带给消费者”，AlanMulally说。

　　大众汽车集团（中国）总裁兼首席执行官Prof·Dr·JochemHeizmann博士认为，汽车行业未来发展靠的是三个支柱：节约资源的生产、高效的移动性和智能的系统。他坚信，要实现这样一些目标，中国的汽车行业需要广泛的合作，包括和供应商进行合作，一个清晰稳定的法律框架和环境，并且能广泛和核心的参与者和合作伙伴建立关系，同时员工要建立紧密的团队合作精神。

　　就中国车企的国际化合作来讲，通过收购沃尔沃和其他一些国际公司，吉利汽车已走到了前列。沃尔沃汽车公司董事长、吉利控股集团创始人兼董事长李书福表示，今年8月，吉利沃尔沃在成都的国产化项目已经获批，这也是中国汽车工业进行中具有非常深远意义的一件事。目前，吉利已立志将中国打造成沃尔沃的第二本土市场，推动沃尔沃汽车在全球范围内的复兴进程。

　　第四届全球汽车论坛共安排16场公开环节，分别就战略机遇、跨国发展、未来汽车、后市场、金融创新、新能源战略、汽车消费、国际化人才等等一系列议题展开了精彩的讨论。论坛组委会执行主席王侠说，中国的汽车梦是世界汽车梦的重要组成部分，全球所有汽车人的共同梦想就是：汽车让社会更美好。这次融合了全球智慧为汽车工业发展建言献策的论坛，正用大家的创造性、建设性、前瞻性的思想，去引领汽车产业的新一轮发展。

　　本届论坛由中国国际贸易促进委员会汽车行业委员会和武汉市人民政府主办，吸引了来自世界20个国家和地区的900多名专业人士参与，其中200多人为外宾或来自境外，使“全球”论坛的性质进一步得到强化。(张宇星)

Click here to read the original article in China News （中文）

Tooth and Nail: Local governments and car makers battle consolidation

China Economic Review, June 2012

China’s car industry gives the impression of a badly tended garden, overgrown and sprawling. Instead of pruning, wayward car plants have received big doses of government support. As a result, China is home to the world’s most fragmented auto industry. According to LMC Automotive, Chinese and foreign auto makers now offer 94 car brands and 476 models in China, compared with less than 40 brands and about 370 models in the US, the world’s second largest market.

Many Chinese brands cling to a tiny share of the market. The top 10 foreign and Chinese manufacturers account for about 80% of the Chinese market, while more than 100 other companies compete in China for the remaining 20%, said Bill Russo, an analyst at Booz & Co.

With so many players, the central government has been forced to split its subsidies many ways, and companies have had more difficulty capturing consumer attention. That has made it difficult for national champions to arise. Both Beijing and industry analysts insist that industry consolidation is an essential part of building strong Chinese car brands.

But consolidation has been a long time coming. Any effort to slim down the industry has to take on profitable car companies and powerful local interests.

A history lesson

The industry’s basic design dates back to Deng Xiaoping, who jump-started China’s economy in the 1980s by encouraging a wave of decentralization. Shanghai, Changchun, Wuhan and other cities were encouraged to build car companies that supplied local cadres and state-owned companies – a system that persists today.

China’s sea of brands became even wider as Beijing gradually began allowing foreign companies to establish joint ventures in China. Unlike Japan or Korea, which built strong domestic industries by banning foreign companies altogether, China grudgingly began to accept foreign-local joint ventures beginning with Volkswagen in 1984.

The original idea was to give state-owned enterprises the opportunity to transfer technology from these partnerships that they could use in creating their own brands. Ultimately, however, these JVs may have waylaid the creation of domestic brands. Analysts say that joint-venture products like the Volkswagen Santana and the Buick Sail were so successful and profitable in China’s rarified market that, for most of the 1990s, both Chinese car companies and local officials were happy to sit back and watch the money roll in, instead of working to improve the quality of domestic products.

“I think where the error has been is that the free money is probably making car companies fat, dumb and happy,” said one Beijing-based industry analyst.

Where to from here?

The central government has aimed to consolidate the industry into six or fewer companies since its inception, but progress has been slower than expected. Analysts say that situation is unlikely to change soon. There are two basic ways to consolidate the industry – bankruptcies and initiatives led by the central government – and neither seems likely to occur in the next few years.

The most efficient and organic way to slim down the industry would be through bankruptcies. But Jenny Gu, an analyst at J.D. Power and Associates, said she doesn’t expect many Chinese car makers to fold in the next two years, since most earned a lot of money from the sales boom of 2009 and 2010.

And while profitability is on the decline, overall industry profits remain higher than in developed markets, said Ivo Naumann, managing director at consultancy AlixPartners. “So far I don’t think the pain is high enough that you would see a massive consolidation process. It would take several years of profitability under pressure before really the consolidation process would take up speed.”

The industry could also be consolidated by government mandate. Beijing has forced through consolidations before, but they tend to be slow and painful. “The key obstacle here is the so-called provincial interest. When you set up a car plant in some city or province, it contributes a lot to local tax revenue and employment,” said Huaibin Lin, an analyst at IHS Automotive. Local governments have often made big investments in attracting these facilities, for example, offering generous tax breaks and discounted land, and they want to see them run their course.

“These investments take four or five years to plan and they last for 20-30 years,” Kevin Wale, managing director of GM China, said at an American Chamber of Commerce event in Shanghai in March. “It’s not unusual that once a city has welcomed you into their culture and their operations that they’re going to continue to try to support you, because [auto manufacturers] are a major source of revenue growth, and associated business and technical skills sets.”

The auto industry demonstrates how Beijing’s role is sometimes limited in a decentralized economy. “That decentralization of power at local levels runs totally contrary to strategy to building a powerful auto industry with strong brands,” said Michael Dunne, an independent auto analyst. “People have been asking me about consolidation since 1990, and it just hasn’t been going that way at all,” he said.

Click here to read the original article in China Economic Review

Stuck in First Gear: Chinese Car Companies Struggle to Compete with Foreign Brands

CKGSB Knowledge, July 30, 2013

Foreign car makers are under attack in China while Chinese auto manufacturers have yet to achieve real success

Can foreign car makers in China continue to dominate the market while appeasing Chinese car companies?

CCTV, Chinaʼs powerful state-run television broadcaster, unleashed a torrent of faulty vehicle claims against foreign automakers in March. First, the network targeted Volkswagen, alleging transmission issues with some of its cars, which led to the recall of more than 380,000 vehicles at an estimated cost of $618 million. The broadcaster then attacked BMW and Daimler, who were accused of selling cars that produced harmful fumes.

The media’s indictment of foreign car makers dovetails with China’s policy to nurture indigenous players. From removing financial incentives for foreign car makers to requiring they launch Chinese car brands, Beijing has tried to curtail the seemingly endless popularity of non-local autos as domestic brands continue to cede ground to their foreign counterparts. Foreign auto manufacturers first set foot in the Chinese car market 30 years ago, fully aware that the state allowed their entry into the market on the condition that they enter into joint ventures (JVs) with domestic firms, who were expected to benefit from their technical expertise. Despite a lack of complete freedom, they’ve flourished ever since, but the latest round of government-sanctioned media criticisms may force foreign companies to change tack.

Slow Start for Chinese Cars

The Chinese car industry has grown rapidly since the nation opened its doors in 1972, shouldering past the US in 2009 to become the word’s largest. Domestic players have profited from this expansion, but their market share is receding compared to foreign car makers: the 30% portion held by Chinese car brands at the end of 2009 fell to 26% in 2012 according to financial research firm Sanford C. Bernstein.

This is not the turn of events China hoped for when it granted foreign auto manufacturers market access in 1984. Beijing knew its car makers were behind the curve on precision manufacturing, so it encouraged JVs with foreign firms to bolster domestic tech-expertise, hopefully leading to a globally recognized national champion.

“The joint venture policy towards the auto businesses in China has always been one of ‘youʼre a guest, youʼre invited and we will tell you the rules by which you must play,ʼ” says William Russo, (formerly a) Senior Advisor at consulting company Booz & Co.

In 1984, Zhao Ziyang, Chinaʼs then premier, said JVs would facilitate the consolidation of the auto market into three large and three small producers, with high levels of local content. Zhaoʼs vision has not come to pass. Different outlets give different estimates—The Wall Street Journal said there were 170 Chinese car makers as of April this year, while the International Business Times cited only 115 companies as of 2012, neither news outlet divulging the source of their information—the China Association of Automobile Manufacturers declined to confirm any specific figure. Either way, even the ballpark is well off from Zhaoʼs prescription.

Not only has consolidation not occurred, but local car makers also remain umbilically dependent on their foreign JVs for profits. Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation (SAIC), Chinaʼs largest car manufacturer, owes 90% of its sales to its foreign JVs, according to a research paper from January this year called “Case Study: SAIC Motor Corporation” published by the US think tank Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). And no Chinese car maker has managed to design and produce a single car that has won global acclaim.

In stark contrast, foreign car makers have thrived. “The Chinese car market is very orientated towards foreign brands. Three out of every four cars sold in China carry a foreign brand,” says Russo.

The China car market, now General Motorʼs (GM) largest, was the US companyʼs savior during the financial crisis, as sales in the nation helped it heave itself out of bankruptcy proceedings in 2009. Since the firm tied itself to SAIC nine years ago, it has amassed 14.7% of Chinaʼs market share, earning a profit of $1.5 billion in 2011 from its joint venture, according to GM China reports. Still confident of its position in China, GM aims to increase sales by 75% in two years to 5 million cars.

China is also Audiʼs most lucrative market. The German manufacturerʼs sales increased by 14.2% in the first quarter of 2013, to almost 103,000 vehicles and it is planning to open a new plant in Foshan, Guangdong province, which will have a manufacturing capacity of 150,000 cars annually when it opens for production at the end of this year according to state-run China Daily.

Still Second Choice

Chinese consumers are buying foreign brands over local ones, because domestic makers are finding it hard to shake off poor repute. “The challenge that Chinese car companies have is convincing their own consumers that Chinese companies in fact can make good cars,” says Russo.

A number of Chinese brand cars have failed foreign safety standards, sullying the reputation of Chinese car makers and making it difficult for indigenous brands to market themselves at home and abroad. Brilliance China Automotive, a firm tied to both Bayerische and Toyota, tried to sell its BS6 sedan in Europe in 2007, but earned only one out of five stars for safety from a German car association, which said the driver would have little chance of surviving a side collision.


(Source: Youtube, Youku video here.)

Chinese car companies find it tough to ratchet up the quality, in part because they lag on research and development spending. “Most Chinese companies are thinking five to six years out with their R&D spending and trying to compete with international companies that are already thinking 20 to 25 years out,” says Nat Ahrens, Deputy Director and Fellow of the Hills Program on Governance at CSIS.

This thrifty approach means Chinese car companies have less to spend on nurturing innovative engineering and design. Instead of creating a car from scratch, which would allow them to claim half the patent rights, Chinese JV partners take existing foreign vehicle blueprints, make a few changes and call it a new JV auto: GM and SAICʼs first JV car, Baojun 630, is built on the old Buick Excelle, while Dongfeng and Nissanʼs fi rst Venucia vehicle is fashioned after Tiida. By taking the path of least resistance, Chinese JV companies demonstrate to the consumer their reliance on foreign tech for quality, which does little to raise confidence in their own brands.

Chinese brands are gaining ground on locally made foreign brands as sales have grown steadily in 2012

Driven to Distraction
The relative success of Western brands against languid domestic ones has sparked indignation and embarrassment among Chinese commentators. In January, Communist Party mouthpiece The Peopleʼs Daily blamed foreign companies for the sluggish performance of domestic players, writing, “Most Chinese car companies involved with JVs have not received the technology they were promised.” In September last year, former machinery and industry minister He Guangyuan said JVs are “like opium” and likened Chinaʼs JV policy to a negative addiction. “So many years have passed and we donʼt even have one brand that can be competitive in the auto word,” He said.

But some feel that Chinaʼs expectations of tech transfer were too high. “I donʼt think any promises were broken, these contracts are laid out very clearly on what was going to be transferred and what wasnʼt… I donʼt think that there was any deception on the part of the foreign partners,” says Ahrens. “You canʼt force technology transfer.”

Market Remodel

As the strength of Western brands has grown, China has pushed back by trimming the incentives and freedoms of foreign automakers. In January last year, China said it would no longer promote investments from foreign car makers through preferential tax treatment and streamlined approval processes, increasing costs for foreign manufacturers.

The month after, Beijing excluded foreign car makers from a newly released list of approved vehicles for government use. While this measure will have little impact on the profits of foreign car makers such as Audi and Mercedes (brands that were included on previous lists), it signaled Beijingʼs determination to freeze out nonlocal competition. In April of the same year, Maxime Picat, the Director General of Peugeot-Citroenʼs Chinese joint venture, said Beijing was threatening to restrict the firmʼs manufacturing expansion plans unless it launched local brands.

The squeeze on foreign auto manufacturers is likely to put a strain on existing JV relationships, making the negotiation process for new deals increasingly delicate. The conflict inherent in a joint venture between two would-be competitors is clear. “A foreign companyʼs interest is not to nurture a local company so that it is as successful or more successful than itself. It will undoubtedly withhold some of its crucial technology,” says Teng Bingsheng, Associate Professor of Strategic Management at the Cheung Kong Graduate School of Business. At the same time, domestic firms are bartering with access to the largest auto market in the world at a time when foreign firms, whose own markets are drying up, can ill afford to be choosy. Under government pressure, the biggest challenge for an existing foreign JV partner will be how to relinquish enough intellectual property to placate Beijing, while at the same time, invest sufficient amounts in R&D to maintain its lead over local and other international players.

But Chinaʼs actions are not likely to wean consumers off foreign brands as the central issue is one of demand not supply. “Government policy cannot change the nature of demand. Chinese consumers will spend their money on the brands they prefer and there is very little that can be done to force Chinese consumers to buy Chinese brands,” says Russo.

This Chinese consumer preference is likely why state media reports went after foreign car makers to begin with, to damage their brand equity in hopes of restoring balance between foreign and domestic brand preference. But it will take more than a few quality-control reports to undo the brand resonance of foreign cars. Chinese brands will have to spend a significant amount of time garnering consumer confidence before they become as popular as well known international car makers.

The Chinese government’s distortion of the market may also have unintended consequences. The launch of new domestic brands by forcing JVs will add another level of competition to an already fragmented market and take business away from Chinese companies who are already struggling to build their market share. By ramping up competition, China in fact weakens the position of wholly domestic brands like Chery and BYD, thus stifling their own plans for a national champion.

“For example, if GM launches a domestic brand, customers that would otherwise be buying a Chery or BYD car will see a car coming from Shanghai General Motors [the GM joint venture with SAIC] and will buy that instead,” says Russo. “So they [the State] are going to eat their own young.”

Just a Fender Bender

Despite Beijingʼs cooling approach to foreign car makers, the countryʼs leaders are unlikely to stifle them completely. “At the end of the day, the government wants to see the domestic car industry succeed, but many of the Chinese companies depend on successful foreign joint ventures to contribute to their profitability and they wonʼt do anything to harm those companies, because that would ultimately harm the whole industry,” says Russo.

In spite of the complications, foreign car makers are finding their tie-ups beneficial in some ways. GM is using SAICʼs low-cost vehicle technology to vault into emerging Asian markets. SAICʼs technology for producing cars priced as low as $4,800 is central to GMʼs plans to plugmiddle-class needs in India and Indonesia. Also it has been reported that BMW and Chinese Brilliance brand Zhi Nuo—which roughly translates as “The Promise”—may start exporting their vehicles to Europe.

The governmentʼs latest measures to suckle a national auto champion are unlikely to seriously dent foreign makersʼ prospects in the short-term. Ultimately, consumer choice determines the winners and losers and the Chinese are increasingly buying foreign brand vehicles. Also, the structure of the market is so dependent on symbiotic JVs that separation in the near term would damage both parties.

The biggest long-term threat to foreign car makers in China is competition from increasingly sophisticated Chinese brands, whose manufacturing skills are developing steadily. Nissan and Honda, two Japanese brands known for their attention to detail, stated publicly that they now outsource heavily to local Chinese suppliers. Quintessentially precise Mercedes-Benz-manufacturer Daimler opened a trial engine production plant in China in May. A decade ago, this would have been unthinkable given the quality of production in China.

Experts draw comparisons between the fledgling Chinese car market and the early Japanese one. In the 1970s, consumers largely thought of Japanese cars as cheap machines. Now, Japanese manufacturers produce premium lines. Hyundai was originally well known for its affordably priced cars, and now makes very innovative, high-quality products. “Great Wall, Geely and Shanghai Auto are capable of making good, quality cars and give an indication that the Chinese car industry will be able to produce a globally competitive car company,” says Russo. “Itʼs a question of time.”

Click here to read this article at http://knowledge.ckgsb.edu.cn

PSA有意向东风出售30%股份 分析称谈判艰难

China Business News, July 11, 2013

PSA出售股权将是一场艰难漫长的谈判，但欧洲主流汽车公司与中国第二大汽车集团产生关联，必然会给全球汽车业带来震动。

　　文｜CBN记者 宁华 张晶

　　资料整理｜张鑫 张嵩浩 华薇薇

　　PSA有意向东风汽车集团出售30%股份的消息，令汽车业的其他新闻失去了吸引力，也让在逐渐放缓的中国市场为销量绞尽脑汁的汽车业人士可以暂时从枯燥的数字中抽身。

　　这则消息最早是路透社于6月27日披露出来的，并在几天后开始被中国媒体引用。消息如此突然，以至于PSA在华合资公司的职员也得向亚太区总部打探消息，最后他们得到了跟新闻界一样的答案：还没有任何正式消息。

　　PSA在欧洲是第二大汽车公司，仅次于大众，而东风则是中国第二大国有汽车集团，按照整体销售额计算，东风去年能排到福布斯汽车业排行榜的第11位。正因如此，即便双方的接触仅仅是个开始，距离最终完成交易还相去甚远，也具有足够的爆炸性。

　　前克莱斯勒东北亚区副总裁、现任博斯咨询公司高级专家Bill Russo在接受《第一财经周刊》采访时说“完成交易将非常复杂而且旷日持久。除了交易价格的谈判之外，双方必须寻求各自董事会通过，交易同时需要得到中法两国政府的认可—所有这一切都非常耗时。”

　　法国《世界报》长期跟踪报道PSA的记者Philippe Jacqué告诉《第一财经周刊》，这毫无疑问会令欧洲汽车业为之震动。“如果东风获得PSA的控制权，将意味着标志家族一段200年的故事结束，但东风只是如果少量持股，那不过是PSA故事的一个新插曲。”他说。

　　7月2日，PSA监事会主席Thierry Peugeot出现在合资公司第三工厂的剪彩仪式上，给传闻增添了一丝真实性。一位东风内部人士透露，之前PSA因资金压力考虑停止类似于空气混合动力这样的先进技术开发时，东风还曾表示愿意投入资金接手，让开发工作能够继续。这足以说明东风对PSA充满兴趣。

　　另一位接近东风汽车高层的前员工告诉《第一财经周刊》，早在2011年PSA就曾主动找过东风，询问后者是否有兴趣入股。东风的条件是不满足于仅仅成为投资者，希望在技术上有更多的合作，而PSA不愿失去对公司的控制。

　　这些原则在PSA与东风的此次谈判中同样适用，但PSA的情况在过去两年持续恶化令情况发生转变。简单来说，PSA更缺钱了。

　　从事并购法律咨询工作的法国德垣律师事务所创建人石仁林对《第一财经周刊》表示，从法律上讲，控股权和投票权原则上是可以分离的。因为投票权的不同，一些股东的权力被放大，一些股东的权力受到限制。如果投票权一直掌握在标致家族手中，东风汽车入股的意义不大，因为不能实际行使权力。仅仅持有股权而无投票权，意味着成为金融股东，只参与利润分配。但以PSA目前的状况，并没有利润可供分配。“因此，我想这笔交易不会以这种方式进行。”

　　过去一年，PSA花光了30亿欧元的运营现金流，市值从2002年的超过200亿欧元锐减至不足25亿欧元。现在它正以每月2亿欧元的速度在烧钱。预计2014年还将消耗15亿欧元。按照这样的现金消耗速度计算，PSA持有的73亿欧元最多还可以维持企业运营两年。眼下或许PSA不需要现金，但从长期而言，为保证技术研发以及2016至2017年正常发布，PSA肯定需要大量新资金的注入。

　　Bill Russo说：“考虑到目前的财务状况，PSA最需要的就是寻求新的资本来源。为了支持接下来的商业计划，它必须尽快在今年就注入资本。”

　　欧洲市场的萎缩令所有主流汽车公司都受到影响，但由于PSA的业务核心主要集中在欧洲，占到总销量六成以上，因此它受到的打击最为致命。

　　去年PSA总共销售了约300万辆汽车，净亏损50亿欧元，其中中国和拉美两个主要海外市场分别销售了44万辆和11万辆，这样的海外销售比例显然无法给PSA带来足够的灵活性。

　　Philippe Jacque评论说：“随着欧债危机的发生，PSA在法国、西班牙、意大利的销量大幅萎缩，失去和其他汽车制造商较量的根基。PSA不同于有其他强劲市场的大众，也比不上拥有美国克莱斯勒的菲亚特，或者是有日产可以依赖的雷诺，它孤立无援，只能依赖自身。”

　　PSA的问题从2000年那一轮扩张开始就已经埋下了伏笔。

　　菲利普·瓦兰的前任CEO当时制定了400万辆的销售目标，并随之将生产规模扩大至能够实现这一目标。问题在于，从纺织业起家的保守的标志家族将公司定位于一流的欧洲汽车公司，而非全球性汽车公司。1976年收购雪铁龙组建起PSA集团后，标志家族还花费了大量资金收购股票来保证控制权。公司甚至曾与一些竞争对手，比如丰田和菲亚特达成一次性交易，出售整条产品线来保持公司独立性不受损。

　　2008年金融危机发生的时候，法国的PSA和雷诺均受到重创。法国政府向这两家公司施以援手，向他们贷款数十亿欧元，推出“以旧换新”计划来帮助它们在法国维持销量。与此同时，PSA和雷诺都在压缩成本并推迟了对新车的投资。这些措施一开始看起来成效不错，雷诺和标致一度复苏，到了2010年两家公司都开始盈利，它们甚至提前偿还了政府贷款。但是从那之后，雷诺继续稳健的策略，而PSA重新开始投资新项目，最典型的例子是在中国的产能扩张。

　　PSA在这一轮欧洲危机中受创比雷诺更严重的另一个原因是，雷诺有低端入门型产品可以维持销量，而PSA主要销售尺寸更大的主流车型。

　　产能过剩和成本过高是PSA急需解决的两大问题，PSA法国工厂的开工率现在只有71%。为了降低成本，PSA要在2015年前裁员1.1万人，关闭一间位于巴黎北部的工厂，并与通用汽车合作降低研发和采购成本。此外，它还需要在中国、拉美和俄罗斯这些新兴市场扩张，以及在欧洲进入高端市场来获取更多的销售利润。

　　但是这些措施要么因为法国政府的援助和工会的介入无法顺利实施，要么需要新的投资。

　　Philippe Jacque透露说，这些天来巴黎每个去PSA总部的银行家都会提出他们的解决方案以及对未来种种可能的见解。看上去东风与通用汽车都已经与PSA进行过接触，不排除PSA还在与其它汽车公司接触的可能。

　　“有一个法国咨询公司受雇于法国政府，提出了一个针对PSA的解决方案。这是一份机密文件，我没看过，但我知道方案的结论，即通用汽车是更好的选择。”Philippe Jacque说。

　　目前看来，通用和东风是最有可能的买家。前者已经与PSA进行合作，东风则是PSA在最重要的海外市场的合资伙伴。虽然通用汽车已经明确表示不再购入PSA股份，但也不排除这是一种谈判技巧，以尽量低的代价获得更多利益。

　　标志家族恐怕已经意识到，失去对PSA的控制权只是时间问题，他们目前持有25.4%的股份和38.1%的投票权，因此选择一个适合的买家至关重要。

　　Bill Russo认为，选择东风的好处在于，可以由此拓展技术研发、品牌管理和销售渠道。显而易见，PSA未来的成功依赖于中国市场的持续扩张。东风对于PSA业务的直接投入，将能够确保双方共同在这个重要市场进行业务扩张。PSA亚洲区负责人Gregoire Olivier曾预测中国可能在2015年超过法国成为PSA销量最大的市场。

　　中国已经成为PSA在全球的第二大市场。今年上半年，神龙汽车的销量为27.7万辆，同比增长了33%。这明显高于中国乘用车市场的增长率，后者的增长率为14%。PSA在中国的强劲增长，有利于帮助其分担欧洲市场的风险和压力。而东风汽车也能通过合作提升技术研发能力，品牌管理能力和销售能力。

　　而通用的优势在于双方在产品研发，采购和生产运营中的协同效应。通用已经投入4.23亿美元购入PSA集团7%的股权，并共同组建了采购和研发的协作平台。一旦能够完成股权收购，通用在欧洲的子公司欧宝还可以与PSA共同使用一些工厂，化解产能过剩。

　　欧洲媒体普遍看好通用。但是巴克莱银行的分析师认为通用汽车和PSA进一步合作的可能性不大。他称，开始的那笔投入看上去是个错误，进一步注资“是在填无底洞”。通用汽车今年2月公布的财务数据显示，结盟一年来，PSA股票价格下跌了50%，通用汽车所持的7%股权价值损失了2.12亿美元。

　　如果继续注资对通用汽车而言是“无底洞”，随之而来的一个疑问是东风作为一家从未有过全球化运作和先进技术开发经验的公司如何能化险为夷？

　　吉利收购沃尔沃或许是个正面案例，但这两者的情况略有不同。沃尔沃是被吉利完全收购的。而东风可能只是购入PSA的一些股份，其他股东依然保留。

　　“一旦交易完成，对于东风和PSA都意味着更为复杂的配置。因为双方都有目标不一的政府投资者。吉利是个独立的汽车制造商，决策相对东风这种国企来说更为直接，我相信对于东风和PSA来说，任何业务的合作都会充满挑战。东风需要能确保PSA重组全球业务来实现盈利，与此同时增加自己在中国的投资。”Bill Russo说。

　　由于东风在中国同时还与日产、雷诺、起亚等全球性汽车公司建有合资企业，这些都是PSA的直接竞争对手，因此拥有一家公司，同时还能了解到大量竞争对手的机密信息看起来也是一件非常奇怪的事情。

　　由于法国政府的介入以及东风的背景背景，这桩交易的复杂程度还超出了公司管理和技术层面。整个股权转让过程必然要经过法国政府的许可。

　　PSA在新技术专利方面是法国第一，法国政府无疑想留住这笔珍贵的资产，打算进一步提供资助。因此政府阻挠了PSA关闭工厂、裁员等举措。政府还派前空中客车母公司EADS的首席执行官Louis Gallois为PSA顾问小组的独立管理者，进入公司董事会，以此作为资助PSA的一个条件。

　　至于风险，法国政府会担心PSA的核心技术转让问题，以及工作岗位的外流。鉴于通用与PSA的关系，前者可能也会担心类似的问题。

　　石仁林说：“目前我们看到的只是谣言，对时间的估算必须从签订第一个意向书开始，如果能一直往前走，通常情况下，交易完成快则半年，慢则一年。”

　　这其中涉及到实地对资产考察、技术和财务上的审查，即便双方签订了股权转让协议，还需要获得工会和政府的同意，调集资金，替换掉原有的一些资金担保，完成人事安排和股权交割。

　　Bill Russo说：“和东风的这笔交易得到许可的漫长过程可能无法满足PSA日常运营的紧迫性。PSA必须寻求多个资金来源，不可能完全倚赖与东风达成交易。”

　　石仁林还表示，作为外国股东，最大的阻力可能来自于工会。西方国家的独立工会号召力强，而且谈判经验丰富。对于中国这种正在发展的国家，收购之后的重心转移可能会带来严重后果。

　　单从商业层面考虑，让其他国家的公司成为PSA新股东并非坏事，近年来的成功案例往往来自于亚洲公司对传统欧美公司的收购。塔塔与捷豹、路虎的合作非常顺利，上汽集团通过购买荣威和名爵获得了技术并成功地扩大了销量，吉利收购沃尔沃还有待观察，但双方在新车型开发和中国工厂上也取得了显着进展。

　　无论PSA与东风的交易最终能否实现，都再一次表明，市场转移给庞大的汽车业带来的影响。大众抓住中国市场挑战丰田和通用，除销量外用任何指标衡量它都已经是实际上的全球第一。通用则借助中国市场从破产重组中成功复兴。对于中国汽车公司来说，这样的机会在接下来的10或20年里肯定会反复出现。

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Amaze works wonders for Honda's brand makeover, more launches lined up

The Economic Times of India, June 16, 2013

Hironori Kanayama, President of Honda Cars India, Ltd.

The plush showroom in Noida is abuzz. Monthly footfalls have surged from 200 early this year to about 500. From worrying about poor sales, the dealer is now grappling with a three-month-long waiting list. Business hours are often extended and not just at the Noida dealership to manage the customer surge.

It wasn't always this way for Honda Cars India Ltd (HCIL). A slew of missteps from mispricing premium hatchback Jazz, to ignoring the mass market and, subsequently the diesel segment when the price differential with petrol widened coupled with a few natural calamities elsewhere like an earthquake in Japan and floods in Thailand hit HCIL hard. Between fiscal years 2007 and 2013, market share steadily dropped from a peak of 4.44% to a low of 2.74%. Volkswagen's Vento and Hyundai's Verna eroded Honda's leadership position in sedans, where the City once ruled the roost; and models like the Hyundai Elantra and Toyota Camry began giving Honda's Civic and Accord a run for their money in the executive sedan and premium sedan segments, respectively.

"Honda was an aspirational brand, rich in features and looks. But it also came across as an overpriced and highly decontented [industry terminology for removal of features] vehicle," says V Ramakrishnan, managing director at Frost & Sullivan India, a consultancy firm. The short point: Honda wasn't getting anything right: neither product, nor price nor positioning.

It required just one launch to turn things around. The Amaze, launched just two months ago, has helped HCIL, according to SIAM, jump one place to No. 5 in May, ending the month with a share of 5.63% of the Indian car market. With total sales of 11,342, HCIL's sales grew 9.8% in May over a year ago in a sluggish market where competitors like Maruti (decline of 13%), Toyota (decline of 35%) felt the brunt.

"This is our counterattack. Amaze is our first weapon. We have many more," says HCIL CEO Hironori Kanayama. Adds Jnaneshwar Sen, senior V-P (sales & marketing): "We have managed to hit the sweet spot."

It may be just one model that has reversed HCIL's fortunes, but to create that winning product called for a complete overhaul of the company's DNA an exercise that began two years ago.

Thinking Frugal

Honda's biggest challenge was to learn new and cheaper ways to develop and produce cars in India. Earlier, Honda developed global models and then tried to localise for each new market. For the Amaze, inputs from India began trickling in right from the beginning of the R&D process.

Between the Brio hatchback launched in 2011 and the Amaze, HCIL worked aggressively to contain costs by developing local vendors without compromising on quality.

From 102 vendors at the pre-Brio stage, HCIL's vendor base has now grown to over 200 (the majority of them non-Japanese), helping Honda achieve 92% localisation. Aditya Auto is one of HCIL's newer vendors, which began working with the carmaker three years ago. HCIL was looking for a cost-efficient way to produce window regulator systems in India that met its quality parameters. It had traditionally used a wire type rope mechanism that was imported from Thailand but was costly.

"Honda gave us targets and asked us to give them solutions. We fundamentally changed the design of the window regulator," says Mihir Jayaraman, the vendor's business unit head. In the process, Jayaraman also brought the cost down by 35%. The decade old vendor, which has annual revenues of Rs 250 crore, now also supplies to Honda Thailand.

City vs Amaze Buyers

HCIL also reworked its branding and marketing strategy. It began by first understanding how the Amaze buyers would be different from say a City buyer. The latter is typically a well-todo discerning customer who enjoys the finer aspects of life, for whom brand is important, who is a trendsetter (and hence experimental) and has reached a certain status hence takes certain things for granted.

The Amaze buyers, HCIL reckoned, would be more conservative, seeking products that offer peace of mind; that meant not just an affordable price tag but also a reasonable cost of ownership. For them, status, comfort and safety are important. Also, more Amaze owners would tend to drive their cars than City owners; and more of them would be in Tier II cities.

That's one big reason for HCIL expanding in smaller cities from 150 outlets in 90 cities to 162 in 102 by the end of this fiscal year. Alongside, the showrooms, which have always been plush and spacious with plenty of glass and chrome are getting an informal touch. Now salesmen in T-shirts add a touch of warmth and casualness to the customer care experience. "We learnt a lot from the Brio. We want customers to get the Honda brand experience with a more warm and approachable feel," says Sen.

In an attempt to change the traditional customer base from chauffeur-driven to ownerdriven, HCIL has spruced up the owners' lounge at its service centres by enlarging it and adding more facilities like PCs, TVs, and snacks and coffee counters.

To change the perception that Honda is an expensive brand and only for sophisticated (City) customers, HCIL has introduced a Rs 9,996 maintenance package for up to two years or 40,000 km. "The Amaze compares well with the Dzire on maintenance costs," adds Sen.

Brand Makeover

Honda also rejigged its advertising and marketing strategy. "Honda had a very inward-looking mentality," says an advertising executive who has worked on the Honda brand for close to five years. The decisions were largely driven by Japanese expats whose understanding of India and Indians was often poor. "Its ad campaigns were very English, very conservative, very print-driven and often did not realise the power of TV in India," adds the adman who did not want to be named.

Traditionally, Honda believed that technology lay under the bonnet and hence stressed on engineering excellence. "But the Koreans changed the game from being what's under the bonnet to equally about what's on the dashboard. But Honda was cussed, stubborn about it," recalls the executive. It would show more car angles than consumer benefits. So the brand became inaccessible even as other companies like VW came and created a marketing buzz.

"The reins are now with the Indians. I haven't met the Japanese even once," says an ad executive working on the Amaze account. HCIL's typical ads were high on gloss, with brochures and designs that were very European with skyscrapers in the backdrop. Even the Brio campaign "It loves you back" was for an English speaking audience.

In contrast, the Amaze campaigns showcase a slice of a regular Indian's life, with kite flying, Holi colours and India Gate thrown in. And they're now TV-driven. The ad film was shot in two settings — one in the north and the other in the south and has been dubbed in 14 Indian languages to cater to a very heterogeneous market. The objective clearly was to have an imagery similar to that of Maruti's advertising. "Their campaigns suggest they have got the insight right. They have become a friendlier brand," says Naresh Gupta, managing partner, Bang in the Middle, a boutique advertising firm. Gupta, an ex-Dentsu executive, had worked on the Honda account earlier.

The Global View

HCIL's newfound drive in India ties in with its global ambitions. By 2017, Honda is looking at sales volumes of 6 million cars with emerging markets bringing in half of them.

Getting the India act together is an imperative particularly when Honda is struggling in the other emerging market that matters, China, where its market share has slipped from 5.5% in 2008 to 3.2%. "Honda made a strategic misstep in China in 2008 mainly by scaling back its expansion plan after the financial crisis; it was illprepared for the soaring demand in China that followed post-2008," says Bill Russo, a senior adviser at consultancy Booz & Co.

Back in India, it is still early days, but HCIL will take heart from one statistic: some 88% of the customers who visited Honda showrooms to check out the Amaze had never owned a Honda car. "The Amaze is bringing a lot of new customers into the Honda fold. It is a great source of future business for us," says Sen. And roughly a third of Amaze customers are from Tier II cities.

What has always been HCIL's trump card is that those who bought Honda cars had few problems with them. In the JD Power rankings on parameters like customer satisfaction and product quality, it's always been ranked amongst the top 2.

"Honda may not have the sales but it always enjoyed great equity among Indian consumers," says Mohit Arora, executive director, JD Power Asia Pacific. "Now, with new models they are fixing their biggest problem of the right product-price equation. Maruti should be seriously worried," he adds.

Subhabrata Ghosh, CEO, Celsius 100, a consulting firm focussed on the auto sector, says the task of moving down the price spectrum is easier than going bottom-up. "Honda is a socially aspirational and emotionally satisfying brand. It is not very difficult for a brand like that to come down a step below and become accessible to a broader set of customers." In contrast, Maruti has found it tougher to move from the mass market into more exclusive segments.

There will be new challenges along the way. For instance, the new set of customers will use their cars more conservatively than Honda's earlier buyers of the more premium cars; Amaze buyers will look for a replacement only after 5-7 years as against the more affluent City customer who will typically buy a new car after 3-5 years, says Ghosh. At the same time, with more customers coming from smaller cities, where road conditions may not be the best, there could be compromises on preventive maintenance.

Even as HCIL succeeds in expanding its customer base, its famed attributes of maintaining quality and reliability will be tested like never before. The Makeover...

More launches
After the Amaze and a diesel engine, new launches include an MPV, SUV and diesel variants by 2015

More investments

Rs 2,500 crore to double manufacturing capacity to 2.4 lakh by 2014

More local vendors
Vendor base is up from 102 in the pre-Brio phase to 200-plus now to boost localisation and control costs

Sharper India thrust
Y Matsumoto, in charge of development, production (Asia, Oceania) drafted to India to beef up local expertise

Sharper brand message
From English ad campaigns, ads now have an Indian touch and are in seven local languages; dealers & customer care have been re-jigged accordingly

Sharper dealer connect
From a decentralised set up, a new software now connects all dealers giving Honda real-time customer & complaints data

Savvier service
Owners' lounge at service centres being spruced up to cater to new buyers



CEO Speaks On Honda India's biggest challenge: We are weak on our cost competitiveness. We are improving it but we need to work on it harder.

On market share: Our target is not just to become big in India or grow our market share. We want to be the most trusted company. We want to expand our universe in India but also maintain and further increase our quality and customer care.

On Honda India and its global relevance: India is a very unique market, very different than even other emerging markets. Half the market here is of hatchbacks. I am not sure how transportable to other markets are the lessons we learn here. We do not have big export plans - not more than 10%.

On his management style: I have my food in the plant canteen. I queue up and often have Indian food. My rationale is if my people are looking left, I cannot look right. That is wrong. It creates hurdles. I have to be part of them. We need to move in the same direction. I often do direct meetings with people below to get their views.

On his toughest challenge: When I went to Honda China, quality, sales and service was a huge concern in 1998. We used to import Accords then. By the time I left we were exporting cars to Europe. Our quality there became world-class.

Click here to read the article at The Economic Times of India

汽车业：召回频增凸显质量管控难题

China Business News, June 21, 2013

Click here to read the original article (in Chinese)

今年1月份起，经国务院常务会议去年10月份通过的《缺陷汽车产品召回管理条例》（下称《条例》)将施行。从召回管理办法上升到管理条例，召回力度的加大将督促汽车厂商对不合格的产品进行召回的次数增加。今年以来，上汽通用五菱、大众汽车、江淮汽车等先后进行了召回，其中召回频率相对较高的仍是斯巴鲁汽车，在过去的一年内，斯巴鲁汽车在中国已经进行了三次召回。

“汽车厂商对其汽车召回是其产品设计或者质量有瑕疵。汽车产品是较为复杂的日用消费品，对汽车设计乃至生产质量管控好的企业也可能会生产出有瑕疵的汽车，不过如果一些汽车厂商的召回频率比较高，那或许说明其在研发设计阶段或者供应链管理上出现了管理难题。”中国汽车技术研究中心一位长期关注汽车召回的专家王强（化名）告诉记者。

召回或将频繁

公开资料显示，从2004年3月国家质检总局等四部门发布《缺陷汽车产品召回管理规定》开始，中国实行实行缺陷汽车产品召回制度。截至2011年底，共实施召回419次，累计召回缺陷汽车产品621.1万辆，到去年《条例》获得通过，累计召回的缺陷汽车多达898.6万辆。

上述《条例》还对隐瞒汽车产品缺陷、不实施召回等违法行为加大了处罚力度。《条例》规定，生产者、经营者不配合产品质量监督部门缺陷调查，或生产者未按照已备案的召回计划实施召回，或生产者未将召回计划通报销售者，由产品质量监管部门责令改正；拒不改正的，处50万元以上100万元以下的罚款。

“该《条例》通过并颁布之后，将从原来的部门规章升格为行政法规，将对行业也有更高的法律效力和约束力。”王强表示。

从今年1月份开始，经本报统计国家质检总局发布的召回公报显示，共有宝马、克莱斯勒、现代等28家汽车厂商47次的召回。

而去年同期，国家质检总局发布的召回公报显示，包括标致雪铁龙、宝马等共有21家厂商进行了34次召回。

博斯公司汽车行业高级专家罗威在接受本报记者采访时分析，汽车的复杂性是这些年汽车召回越来越多的原因。他认为，汽车是最复杂的零售产品，未来，汽车会配置越来越多的汽车电子系统，同时，厂商需要通过全球的产业链条来对其进行汽车集成化生产，因此每家厂商都有可能出现召回，即使对质量把控最为优秀的汽车制造商也会“避之不及”，“不过优秀的汽车厂商召回的频率会比较低”，他说。

“一款新车上市前，整车和零部件都会经过严格的长时间测试，但谁也无法保证所有问题都能够在测试阶段被发现。”一家跨国汽车零部件公司中国区副总裁告诉记者，根据发达市场的经验，新车上市前的严格测试，只能确保车辆能够达到设计要求、安全正常行驶。

一些问题只有在产品大规模投放市场和长时间使用后，才会逐渐被发现。“但是汽车厂商在投放产品到市场之前，尽可能地对投放产品进行多循环的测试非常重要。如果企业多次发生产品召回，应该是其产品质量、供应链管理出现了问题。”他进一步分析说。

供应链管理失衡

科尔尼全球合伙人孙健将汽车召回分成两类，一类是汽车厂商在前期的研发设计上存在先天不合理，另一类是汽车厂商对某些部件的质量管控出现了问题，这主要体现在供应链管理上。

后者，即供应链管理的失控造成的汽车召回，归根结底，是管理资源的匹配失衡问题。

随着汽车市场竞争的加剧，为了提升产品竞争力，对汽车供应链不断提出降低成本的要求逐渐成为汽车厂商降低成本的主要途径。不少汽车零配件供应商相关人士告诉记者，汽车厂商这些年来每年都会要求汽车供应商的价格下滑10%左右。

汽车厂商通过不断压榨汽车供应商来获得竞争力显然不可持续，并存在隐患。

丰田曾抛却了全球知名的精益生产模式，变成了以成本为主导，以质量为代价的生产方式，最终导致了其大规模的召回，影响了品牌形象。

丰田汽车上一任董事长渡边捷昭有句名言叫“拧干毛巾上最后一滴水”，可见对成本控制十分严格。

在企业实际运行中，对成本的合理控制也是一种优势，但是在和产品质量的次序上不能混乱。丰田汽车现任董事长丰田章男在总结丰田汽车2010年召回门事件时对中国记者表示，“丰田模式中第一是安全，第二是质量，第三是数量，第四是成本。但最近一些年，在优先顺序上出了一些问题，同时，公司内部有些人过高地评价了自己取得的业绩，把短期业绩当成了发展的标准。”

孙健建议，汽车厂商对供应链管理应采用灵活的方式，要求供应商降低成本以及自己控制成本都应该在合理范围内，不应该以牺牲产品质量为代价。

Bill Russo to Join Closing Plenary Session at China Automotive Market Development Summit

Chongqing, China, June 6, 2013

美国博斯公司（Booz & Company）高级专家，Synergistics 有限公司创始人、总裁Bill Russo

TOPIC: China Auto market: Making transition from high growth to sustainable development China’s auto market has shifted from very strong growth to slower but still healthy growth. The aim of this final session will be to discuss challenges for OEMs, policy makers, dealers and suppliers, and so on during this period of transition and ways to cope with these challenges. · How should auto enterprises adjust their marketing strategies and operations as we transition to the new market dynamics? · How can government and policy makers assist the development of the industry and render support for major Chinese and foreign players? · What do market changes mean to the industry structure and the relationship between different enterprises? SUN Xiaodong, Vice President, Geely LIU Zhifeng, Vice President & Sales Division Vice General Manager, Beijing Hyundai Motor Company, China Dr. Patrick P. Steinemann, Managing Director & co-head of Asia Industrial Investment Banking, Bank of America Merrill Lynch, USA Bill Russo, Founder and President of Synergistics Limited & Senior Advisor of Booz & Company, USA Moderated by: MA Xiaowei, CEO, iautos, China Click below to read the article on the session from 163.com: Bill Russo: 政府需引导汽车行业的整合