Showing posts with label Mazda. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Mazda. Show all posts

9.18.2012

A sea of trouble surrounds five tiny islands

The Globe and Mail, September 17, 2012

There are reports that a flotilla of about 1,000 Chinese fishing boats is headed for the disputed islands at the heart of the dispute between China and Japan. A move toward the islands – known as Senkaku in Japan and Diaoyu in China – raise the question of whether Japan’s coast guard or navy would confront the ships.

A dispute over a quintet of uninhabited islands is jeopardizing the political and trade relationship between the world’s second and third-largest economies, as a number of Japan’s flagship companies announced temporary closures of their China operations on Monday after being targeted by days of angry protests.

Automakers Nissan Motor Co., Honda Motor Co. and Mazda Motor Corp. – who collectively employ thousands of Chinese workers – each announced they were temporarily suspending production in China after a week of anti-Japanese protests around the country that saw Japanese-owned businesses looted and Japanese cars and restaurants attacked. Other industries, including electronics, food and retail, were also affected and the dispute put global supply chains for Japanese products produced in China under threat.

Protests are expected to crest Tuesday, the anniversary of the 1931 Mukden Incident, a staged attack on a Japanese railroad that was used to justify the Japanese Imperial Army’s invasion and occupation of Manchuria at the outset of the Second World War. There were also reports that a flotilla of some 1,000 Chinese fishing boats was headed towards the disputed islands – which are known as Senkaku in Japan and Diaoyu in China – raising the question of whether Japan’s coast guard and navy would try to confront the ships.

Any kind of trade war – let alone a broader conflict – would be devastating. Commerce between the two Asian giants amounted to $345-billion (U.S.) last year, with many of Japan’s globally known brands, including electronics firms, outsourcing much of their production to China. Already, there have been calls in China for a nationwide boycott of Japanese products. China is Japan’s largest trading partner, while Japan is China’s No. 2 partner after the United States and a major source of direct investment in the Chinese economy.

Joseph Caron, Canada’s former ambassador to both Japan and China, said the situation will require delicate diplomacy from both sides to avoid escalation of the dispute. A heightened conflict would have implications for the global economy as Asia’s manufacturing and supply chains are deeply integrated.

“It’s important not to demonize one side or the other in all this. There is obviously going to be a painful but hopefully non-militarized adjustment to the fact that China’s power is increasing,” Mr. Caron said in an interview. “It is not only China that has legitimate interest in these waters and in the region.

“Unfortunately, we are seeing the manifestations of this adjustment in its worst and most dangerous form.”

Neither country can afford a prolonged break in the trading relationship. The Japanese economy grew just 1.4 per cent in the second quarter of 2012, while China posted 7.6-per-cent growth in the same period, its slowest pace in three years.

“The reality is that while these adjustments are struggling to emerge, in so many other areas, levels of mutual dependence have never been higher,” Mr. Caron said.

Japanese car manufacturers count China as a major market and a driver of future growth. Toyota, Nissan and Honda saw 11 per cent, 17 per cent and 20 per cent of their respective 2011 unit sales from China, according to Bill Russo, China auto analyst at Synergistics.

Mr. Caron said targeted economic sanctions or large-scale boycotts imposed by both China and Japan are a distinct possibility if the dispute is not quickly resolved.

“It’s worrisome. Our economic security depends so much on the success of those economies. So everyone is going to watch this very closely,” he said.

Julian Dierkes, a professor at the Institute for Asian Research at the University of British Columbia, said he was optimistic that the deep economic ties between the two countries would keep the dispute from getting out of hand.

“The economic implications are huge but that is also the safeguard. ... It must be very clear to [Chinese] businesses and industry that there is no way to decouple from Japanese industry. Those inter-linkages are so clear and obvious,” Mr. Dierkes said.

Some of the protesters in Beijing admitted they weren’t sure how they could live without their Japanese electronics, fashions and snacks. “Japan is bullying China and I hope Japan does not take Chinese tolerance for granted,” said Zhang Liguo, a 17-year-old student who joined the protests at the Japanese embassy.

“But we cannot deny the advantages of Japanese products.”

The temporary closure of Japanese manufacturing facilities and other businesses came as the United States announced a new trade action against China. Speaking in Ohio, a hub of American auto parts manufacturing, president Barack Obama accused China of illegally providing $1-billion worth of subsidies to its auto parts industry.

“These are subsidies that directly harm working men and women on the assembly line in Ohio and Michigan and across the Midwest... . It's not right, it's against the rules and we will not let it stand,” Mr. Obama said.

8.29.2012

Ford eyes China's wealthy drivers with coastal plant

Reuters,  August 29, 2012




By Deepa Seetharaman
HANGZHOU, China | Wed Aug 29, 2012 3:50pm IST
(Reuters) - Ford Motor Co (F.N) and its Chinese partner will begin building its first factory on China's coast, where the U.S. automaker can easily access the country's growing number of affluent buyers.
The $760 million factory is one of five Ford is building to cement its place in the world's largest auto market. Ford is also building a third assembly plant at its manufacturing hub in the central Chinese city of Chongqing.
Building vehicles in Hangzhou - a city of more than 6 million people to the south of Shanghai - draws Ford closer to China's wealthier population along the coast. It also provides Ford with an accessible port so it can export vehicles in the future, although Ford said it is now focused on building cars for the Chinese market.
"Hangzhou is really critical because of the market that it serves, and it diversifies our operations," Chief Executive Alan Mulally said after a groundbreaking event in Hangzhou on Wednesday. "The customer base here is fantastic."
Since 2006, Ford has poured nearly $5 billion into China with the aim of doubling capacity, employees and dealers by 2015. The plant in Hangzhou will be able to build 250,000 vehicles when it opens in three years.
GRAPHIC: Ford in China r.reuters.com/gek32t
LINCOLN LUXURY
Ford is the latest in a long list of automakers vying to launch or expand top-tier brands in China, where luxury car sales are expected to surpass those in the United States within 8 years. It plans to bring its Lincoln brand to China by 2014.
At an event at a converted Buddhist temple in Beijing on Tuesday, Ford executives said Lincoln could win over buyers partly by drawing on its legacy of building iconic cars like the Zephyr and Continental. But they also said China represented a rare chance for Lincoln to reinvent itself and skirt past its stale image, which has hurt sales in the United States.
"We have a chance to be different here," Ford's global marketing chief Jim Farley said. "We see the opportunity in China for the first time to launch Lincoln from scratch. China could teach us things we could incorporate into the experience side in North America."
By offering a premium car with Lincoln, Ford could be more attractive to dealers, helping the company gain traction in the Chinese market, Booz & Co consultant Bill Russo said.
LOW-COST APPEAL, TOO
The U.S. automaker is also launching 15 Ford brand models to China by 2015. One of those will be a low-cost car to appeal to buyers in China's fast-growing cities in the West. That model will rival the Chevrolet Sail, a car developed by General Motors (GM.N) and its Chinese partners that sells for less than $10,000.
Earlier this week, Mulally and other top executives marked another groundbreaking of the automaker's third assembly plant in Chongqing, home to Ford's massive manufacturing hub.
The complex is close to China's rapidly developing inland cities, where Ford is looking to win buyers with low-cost models.
Ford chose to build a factory along China's east coast after deciding to break up its three-way tie-up with Japan's Mazda Motor Corp (7261.T) and China's Changan Automobile Co Ltd.
China approved that restructuring, which carves up the joint venture assets between Mazda and Ford, earlier this week and it is now being reviewed by Chinese regulators. Mazda was not involved in selecting a site for the factory.
"This was a Changan Ford decision and a Changan Ford process," Joe Hinrichs, Ford's head of Asian and African operations, told Reuters.

8.28.2012

Ford Says It Got Clearance To Split China Venture With Mazda

Bloomberg News, August 27, 2012

Click here to read the article at bloomberg.com


Ford Motor Co. (F) said it received approval from China’s top economic planner to split its venture in China with Mazda Motor Corp. (7261), paving the way for the U.S. automaker to increase control of its expansion in the country.
The National Development and Reform Commission approved an application for Ford to have a separate venture with Changan Automobile Co. instead of the current three-way ownership structure with Mazda, Ford Chief Executive Officer Alan Mulally told reporters in Chongqing, China today. The plan still needs to be approved by two ministries, Ford said in a statement.
The separation would restore Ford’s ability to have an equal say as its Chinese partner for the first time since 2006, when the U.S. company transferred a 15 percent stake to then- affiliate Mazda. The Dearborn, Michigan-based automaker has sought to break up the China venture after selling down its stake in Mazda in 2008 to raise cash.
“For Ford, they won’t have to think of Mazda and will have more freedom in making decision for future development in China,” said Lin Huaibin, a Shanghai-based analyst with industry researcher IHS Global Insight. “They will be able to make full use of Chongqing as a strategic production base in western China and they can focus on developing their own products suitable for the Chinese market.”
Increasing its stake in the China venture to 50 percent would allow Ford to book more revenue from car sales and parts, according to Bill Russo, a Beijing-based senior adviser at Booz & Co.

China Expansion

Mulally was in Chongqing to attend the groundbreaking ceremony for Ford’s third passenger-vehicle assembly plant in the city, which would add annual capacity of 250,000 vehicles a year when completed.
The reorganization is still subject to approval from the Ministry of Commerce, State Administration of Industry and Commerce and the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, according to Ford.
Ford this year has disclosed moves to add production output in China, including plans to build a $760 million assembly plant in Hangzhou. The company today signed a letter of intent to expand research and development in the country.
“We’re very pleased with the restructuring and the way its going,” Mulally said today. “We have approval from the NDRC and we’re proceeding through the regulatory process, so we’re very appreciative and encouraged.”
To contact Bloomberg News staff for this story: Liza Lin in Shanghai at llin15@bloomberg.net; Ma Jie in Tokyo at jma124@bloomberg.net
To contact the editor responsible for this story: Young-Sam Cho at ycho2@bloomberg.net

Ford Pushes Into China's Interior

The Wall Street Journal, August 26, 2012

Click here to read the article at wsj.com


Ford Motor Co., a latecomer to China's booming auto industry, is counting on businessmen like Feng Shouming to help the company catch up to more established rivals General Motors Co. and Volkswagen AG.
Later this month Mr. Feng will open his seventh Ford dealership in Wuhan, a city of 10 million people in China's interior, a vast region that still offers great potential for smaller players like Ford.
Much of the wealth that China's rapid industrialization has created is located along the country's eastern coast, and car buying has skyrocketed around prosperous cities like Shanghai and Hangzhou. But now the Chinese government, in an effort called "go West," is employing economic policies designed to push investment toward the center and west of the country, and bring more prosperity to regions still dominated by farming culture.
Ford is betting that push will continue the boom in car buying in places like Wuhan, even as growth in auto sales moderate along the coast.
"The automobile industry here is very young and although it is the biggest in the world, it's only been a thriving industry for a decade," said David Schoch, chief executive officer of Ford China.
While not giving up on wealthier coastal provinces, Ford is concentrating its efforts on the dozens of cities in central China with populations of 500,000 to five million people, Mr. Schoch said. "We see a tremendous growth opportunity in the middle and the west."
To make the strategy work, however, Ford needs people like Mr. Feng who are willing to team up with a company that isn't yet up to full strength in China.
In an interview, Mr. Feng said business has been tough, in part because Ford only offers six models in China—the Focus compact and two other small cars; a sport-utility vehicle and a small wagon; and the Mondeo sedan.
In Wuhan, Ford faces a strong local state-owned competitor, Dongfeng Motor Corp., which has a full line of cars, vans and SUVs through partnerships with Nissan MotorCo., Honda Motor Co. and Peugeot SA.
"We just need to hang in there," Mr. Feng said by telephone. "We have every faith and hope in the next few years."
The good news is that Ford is adding a seventh model, the Kuga compact SUV, later this year. On Monday, Ford Chief Executive Alan Mulally will visit a Ford plant under construction in Chonqqing, which is located more than 1,000 miles west of Shanghai and is the manufacturing hub of Ford's China operations.
The factory will be Ford's third in China, part of a $5 billion investment plan it kicked off in 2006. The company is also building an engine plant and a transmission plant at the Chonqqing site.
When those three plants—plus a fourth being built in Hangzhou in the country's east—are operating, Ford will be able to build 1.2 million vehicles in China, which would equate to about 15% of the auto maker's projected global production in 2015.
Because of the heavy investments, Ford's China operations are losing money. Mr. Schoch said results will improve in the second half of 2012 as Kuga goes on sale.
Mr. Schoch added that he thinks Ford is "well positioned" in the hinterlands of central China.
Yet Ford isn't alone in pursuing growth in these regions. Other auto makers are also putting more focus on China's central and western provinces, too, especially now that some major coastal cities have become so overrun with cars and trucks that they are limiting registrations of new ones, said Bill Russo, an auto consultant in Beijing.
"It is only natural that the auto makers are starting to look at how to capture this coming growth. It's not just Ford," Mr. Russo said.
China has already surpassed the U.S. as the world's largest auto market. Ford expects China's overall auto sales to increase from 18.5 million new cars this year to around 30 million by 2020.
There are about 85 vehicles per 1,000 people in China. The U.S. has about 800 vehicles per 1,000 people.
Last year Ford grabbed about a 2% share of the Chinese market, compared with 7.2% for GM brands and 12.9% for Volkswagen. Toyota Motor Corp., Hyundai Motor Co. and Chinese companies such as Geely Automobile Holdings Ltd. are all ahead of Ford, too, according to LMC Automotive.
—Yoli Zhang in Beijing contributed to this article.

3.30.2010

Making the Geely and Volvo Marriage A Success

March 30, 2010

by Bill Russo

Zhejiang Geely Automotive Group's $1.8 billion acquisition of Volvo from Ford represents the most ambitious action to date for a Chinese vehicle manufacturer to accelerate the process of transforming into a global automotive player. Li Shufu has described the deal as the “poor boy from the countryside” (Geely) marrying the “rich girl from the city” (Volvo). Like all wedding ceremonies, Sunday’s deal signing in Gothenburg, Sweden could be described as a celebration of hope and love for the newlyweds.

Sharing the Same Bed, Having Different Dreams

It is a marriage of two automotive companies with very dissimilar backgrounds and histories. The Chinese describe partners with different agendas as “sharing the same bed, but having different dreams”. I have already commented about the sound industrial logic for this deal in my article Ford’s Sale of Volvo to Geely Benefits All Parties, however this only provides the foundation. Building a successful partnership between Volvo and Geely will require a solid plan for post-acquisition integration.

It should be noted that the Volvo acquisition is not Geely’s first cross-border deal. In 2006, Geely partnered with Manganese Bronze to produce components for and assemble London Taxi vehicles. On March 17, 2010 Geely announced plans to become the majority shareholder of Manganese Bronze. In May 2009, Geely acquired the Australian gearbox maker Drivetrain Systems International.

Geely is clearly using an “inorganic” approach to accelerate its development and to improve its ability to compete in the China auto market. The learning applied here could also accelerate its emergence as a global automotive player. However, it is well known that cross-border deals rarely deliver on their initial promise.

Lessons Learned from Failed Automotive Marriages

We are witnessing a historic period in the development of the global automotive industry. The global financial crisis has dramatically weakened the “triad” markets (Western Europe, North America and Japan), and has highlighted the resilience of the emerging markets, led by China. The resultant economic “imbalance” creates opportunities for structural realignment of the industry as assets shift to the higher growth markets.

Clearly there is a need, on the part of the European and North American vehicle manufacturers and suppliers, to find additional sources of funding in order to keep their operations going, while the rapid growth of China’s auto market in recent years has provided Chinese companies with more capacity to invest. However, there are real challenges in making cross-border deals work.

For example, SAIC’s recent acquisition of Ssangyong was fraught with difficulty. The two companies had “different dreams” in terms of what they wanted out of a partnership, and they were not successful. SAIC was: unable to secure concessions from Ssangyong’s labor union to lower costs, unwilling to inject billons of RMB incremental capital to fund the business, and unable to manage the loss of leadership at Ssangyong. Ultimately, SAIC decided to dissolve the deal.

Even the more successful partnerships have had mixed results: by all measures, the Ford alliance with Mazda has been a very good example of a successful cross-border alliance. Ford benefited from access to Mazda’s fuel-efficient technologies and platforms, and both sides benefited from a shared global production and distribution footprint. However, Ford recently made the decision to liquidate its shares in Mazda in order to raise much-needed cash.

One of the most famous cases was the failed 9-year marriage of Daimler-Benz and Chrysler. Announced to the world in 1998 as a $38 billion “merger of equals”, the deal was ultimately dissolved in 2007.

The causes of failure for this deal are noteworthy:



1. Strategic Mis-Alignment: While each company had a sound rationale for partnership, there was a lack of alignment between the architects of the deal and the organizations they led. Juergen Schrempp was seeking to build scale and elevate the prominence of the automotive business in the Daimler-Benz portfolio of companies. Bob Eaton was seeking to expand Chrysler’s global reach beyond its core North American market. While on the surface it appeared compatible, this vision lacked sufficient top-down direction needed to build a globally integrated automotive enterprise. The target for achieving “synergy” resulting from achievement of a cost-savings target became the sole objective of the post-merger integration team, and meaningful integration of the core automotive business was never established as a concrete target.



2. Brand Tension: The brands of Daimler and Chrysler do not overlap, however the struggle over brands cut to the heart of the merger integration challenge. In many ways, the brands of a company define the image and aspirations of both its customers as well as its companies. For this reason, the idea of sharing any product, technology, or even resources used in the development or distribution of the product was viewed as a risk of compromising the value proposition of the brands. Daimler was concerned that a direct association with Chrysler would damage the Mercedes-Benz “premium” image. Chrysler was concerned that Daimler’s higher cost structure would make Chrysler’s mass-market brands less cost competitive.



3. Lack of Core Business Integration: The “Chrysler Group” essentially became a division within Daimler-Benz, which was renamed “DaimlerChrysler AG” in November 1998. The only functions that were integrated were the Financial Services division and several corporate staffs including Human Resources, IT, and Corporate Finance. Staff reductions in these functions accounted for much of the “Synergy” of the merger. The core business functions were left unchanged. As a result, the complex decisions of how to share development costs, develop new technologies, share product platforms, cross-load manufacturing plants, and combine marketing and sales functions were completely avoided. As a result, the automotive businesses failed to realize any benefits from the partnership.



4. Brain Drain: It is often stated that the majority of senior leaders of an acquired company leave within a two-year period after the merger. While efforts were made to retain Chrysler’s top leadership, it became very difficult once it became clear that this was never actually a “merger of equals”. Starting with Bob Eaton’s decision to step down as co-CEO, the leadership "flight" at Chrysler accelerated. Within two years, a significant percentage of Chrysler’s top 100 managers had left the company. While it may be difficult to avoid completely, it is critical to plan for the retention of the key leadership, or company performance and employee morale will suffer.



5. Culture Shock: This issue is often mistakenly attributed to differences in language, culture between Germans and Americans. However, this is not the root cause. The challenge is to achieve a true understanding of the respective needs of each partner. This tends to get oversimplified by assuming that language and culture are the problems. Language and cultural misunderstanding creates “resistance” and adds friction among the partners – which makes it difficult to develop a common understanding, but this is not the most fundamentally challenging issue. If this were the case, it would be impossible to explain why similar problems occur when companies merge within the same country. The most difficult issue is to establish a common understanding of what each partner wants out of the relationship – and finding a way to work with that.



Businesses hoping to grow “inorganically” would be wise to learn the lessons from the causes of the failed DaimlerChrysler merger.

Living The Dream: The Immediate Challenges

As a result of the shift of the automotive center of gravity to the east, there is a need to make these cross-border marriages work. A Chinese company investing in foreign assets must understand how to align the interests of the partner in the transaction with their own, or they will likely end up owning assets without the technological development know-how that went into creating those assets.

It all should start with a comprehensive risk-assessment and plan for post-acquisition integration. The key elements of this plan were noted in the article The Path to Globalization of China’s Automotive Industry.

Beyond this, Geely must overcome several other challenges in order to turn around Volvo’s operations. Geely must address the following issues:

1. Strategic Alignment and Governance. Bridging the huge gap between Volvo's traditional European (and some would argue “Scandinavian”) management mode and Geely's dynamic family business mode. This may be the largest challenge for Li Shufu in achieving “synergy” among the automotive units. This will be particularly challenging as Chairman Li has committed to keep independence of Volvo operations.

2. Cost Structure. Since Volvo maintains their current business structure, processes and supply base, it is impossible for Geely to realize the highest benefits of localization for Volvo cars even if they build a new production base in China in the near future. Geely may need to subsidize the Volvo global operation with the very thin margins generated from Geely’s local brand operations, which poses high risk and places pressure on Geely’s working capital.

3. Market Positioning. Geely faces a number of product portfolio and platform decisions regarding Volvo product offerings for China and the global markets. The manufacturing agreement with Chang’An Ford for the Volvo S40 and S80's will need to be addressed and Geely has already stated an objective of building a 300,000-unit production base in China. To achieve this, Volvo products would need to be repositioned in order to serve a mass-market instead of merely following the luxury-market leader Audi.

Marrying Volvo was an ambitious move for a "poor boy from the countryside" with only a little more than a decade of automotive experience. The automotive world is now closely watching to see if they can make it work.

With proper attention to the process of post-acquisition integration, and by addressing the immediate challenges noted here, Geely could indeed use the Volvo acquisition to accelerate the process of transforming itself into a global automotive player.

Click here to view the article published at Gasgoo.com's China Automotive News