Chinese Electric-Car Maker BYD’s Shares Plunge

The Wall Street Journal, December 18, 2014

A BYD Co. electronic vehicle is charged at an EV charging station at the company's campus in the Pingshan district of Shenzhen, China, Aug. 5, 2014. Bloomberg News

By Colum Murphy

Updated Dec. 18, 2014 10:03 a.m. ET

SHANGHAI—An executive at Warren Buffett -backed BYD Co. defended its business prospects after shares in the Chinese electric-car maker fell as much as 47% on Thursday.

In a conference call late Thursday, company secretary Qian Li said BYD’s operations were normal despite the share plunge and sought to dispel what he called rumors about the company. BYD’s Hong Kong-traded shares regained some ground later Thursday and finished at 25.05 Hong Kong dollars (US$3.23), down 29%.

Mr. Li described rumors circulating in the market about BYD—including suggestions that its founder and chairman had been arrested—as “ridiculous” and urged investors to ignore them.

He also dismissed talk of BYD having large exposure to the troubled Russia market, describing the company’s investment in that country as “very small.”
BYD also produces mobile-phone components and solar panels.

Asked whether the price movement could be related to a selloff in shares by Mr. Buffett’s Berkshire Hathaway investment vehicle, Mr. Li said BYD had been in recent contact with Mr. Buffett but there was no sign that Mr. Buffett was considering a sale. He added BYD didn’t reach Mr. Buffett on Thursday due to the time difference between China and the U.S.

Berkshire Hathaway owns a roughly 9% stake in BYD, according to previous company filings, including about one-quarter of its Hong Kong-traded shares. In the Chinese city of Shenzhen, BYD’s shares fell about 10% on Thursday, the daily limit.

In October, BYD reported a third-quarter profit drop of 26% and said it expects this year’s profit to fall by up to 22%. Auto-sales growth in China has slowed in recent months amid a broader drop in China’s economic momentum.

Overall in the first 11 months of 2014, BYD has sold 384,977 vehicles, down from 458,042 vehicles sold in the same period the year before—a 16% drop, according to data from research firm IHS Automotive.

While the company frequently touts its line of electric vehicles and plug-in hybrids—vehicles that can run on both gasoline and electricity—it relies heavily on sales of traditional gasoline engine cars for the lion’s share of its automotive revenue.

Bill Russo, managing director of consulting firm Gao Feng Advisory, said BYD, like many other Chinese car brands, need to create a brand that appeals to Chinese consumers. “It has to go beyond just being a cheap car,” he said. 

Mr. Li said BYD faces “hot competition” and decreasing margins in the traditional car market in China but said it was transforming into a manufacturer of new-energy vehicles.

China has a long-stated goal of reducing its dependency on imported oil by promoting new-energy vehicles, including passenger cars and buses. China wants half a million such vehicles on the road by next year and 10 times that by the end of the decade.

But in the first nine months of this year, fewer than 40,000 electric vehicles were sold in China, according to data from the government-backed China Association of Automobile Manufacturers. Around three quarters of these were passenger cars. By comparison, around 14.2 million conventional passenger cars were sold in the period.

IHS Automotive researcher Namrita Chow said the high cost of replacing batteries, lack of adequate charging infrastructure and range anxiety—where buyers worry about how far they can travel on a single charge—are all obstacles in the path to high sales growth rates.

She said that BYD had doubled sales of its pure electric e6 car to 2,203 vehicles in the first 10 months of this year compared with the same period last year. Sales for the hybrid Qin had so far reached just over 11,000 vehicles in its first year on sale.

Mr. Li dismissed talk that the Chinese government could be reducing its support of new-energy vehicles, including buses, saying BYD continued to see good order flow for them. “We’re confident on the future of electric buses,” Mr. Li said.
A nearly 50% drop in oil prices over the past six months has pressured green stocks in a number of areas.

“With the oil price down, the global outlook for electric vehicles looks very different from just a couple of months ago,” said Jochen Siebert, a Shanghai-based managing director at JSC Automotive Consulting. “BYD’s electric and hybrid car business will likely be impacted,” he added. 

Write to Colum Murphy at colum.murphy@wsj.com

福特SUV，江铃造

CBN Weekly, November 13, 2014

当福特遭遇增长放缓的“天花板”时，一款新车投放或许能够缓解它目前的困境—但并不足够。

　　对于眼下的福特来说，没有什么比一款新车型的到来更及时了。

　　11月13日，福特在北京全球首发一款新SUV车型撼路者（Everest）。有些与众不同的是，这款SUV将由福特在华合资企业—江铃福特生产，并授权其渠道销售。

　　福特在华的两个合资公司—长安福特和江铃福特，此前一直分工明确：前者主攻乘用车市场，后者则经营商用车。

　　近两年，福特堪称在华进步最快的汽车公司之一。今年前10个月，其在中国销量为90.66万辆，而2012年，这一数字仅为62.7万辆。

　　不过最近，“进步最快”的福特似乎也碰到了“天花板”。9月，福特在华销量9.6万辆，同比下降0.2%，结束了连续28个月的增长。销量回落的主要原因是产能。按照规划，2015年年底，长安福特的年产能将达到120万辆，但至今，近一半的目标还未兑现。

　　在此背景下，福特与江铃的合作就颇值得玩味。2011年，福特推出“1515”战略，计划到2015年在中国投放15款新车型。看起来，福特已意识到，单靠长安福特以及其位于重庆的第三工厂，无法完成这一规划。

　　“正在加速扩张的福特没有理由不调动江铃的资源。”咨询机构思略特公司合伙人彭波对《第一财经周刊》说。

　　2010年，福特开始与江铃在乘用车方面展开合作。2013年，福特将其在江铃汽车(32.10, -0.79, -2.40%)的股份从30%提升至32%。“未来，福特汽车将与江铃汽车构建更紧密的合作关系。”在撼路者的发布会上，福特中国董事长兼CEO罗礼祥（John Lawler）表示。

　　同时，撼路者的推出也意味着福特正在谋求更深入地进入SUV细分市场。

　　在过去几十年里，汽车制造商抛弃了传统巨无霸式的SUV，不断改变其尺寸和底盘、外观设计，以满足城市购车者的出行需要。空间紧凑和油耗更低的本田CR-V以及丰田RAV4都是这种趋势的代表。福特和通用在中国推出的翼博（ECO-Boost）和别克昂科拉（Encore）也都获得了成功。

　　而撼路者定位于中大型SUV，2850mm的轴距，柴油发动机技术，源自福特皮卡车型Ranger的底盘。“中型SUV细分市场是中国也是全球成长最快的领域，”罗礼祥对《第一财经周刊》说，“我们相信这款产品一定能够在市场上寻找到自己的市场需求和亮点。”

　　更重要的是，翼博、翼虎，再加上现在的撼路者，福特在中国已全面覆盖小型、紧凑型和中大型SUV市场。“SUV方面，福特已经超过了通用。它正在中国塑造一个SUV领导者的形象。”高风咨询公司董事总经理Bill Russo对《第一财经周刊》说。在中国，“SUV市场领导者”可是个含金量不小的标签。

　　尽管在商用车领域，江铃还算成功，但除了一款月销量不足3000辆的自主SUV品牌驭胜，它并无太多乘用车的生产销售经验。要让一个长于经营商用车的公司在乘用车上取得成功，还是要冒不小的风险。

　　撼路者将在江铃位于南昌的小蓝基地生产。这个基地拥有一座年产30万辆SUV的工厂，以及一座年产20万台汽油发动机的工厂。同时，撼路者所搭载的柴油发动机与江铃主打的商用车型全顺相同，也可在江铃量产。这些生产线全部符合福特全球标准。

　　除了在中国销售，撼路者还将出口到亚太地区的一部分国家进行销售。欧洲和美国汽车消费市场仍经历着销售疲软，亚太地区则是福特近来业绩表现最为优秀的地区，印度、泰国未来都可能成为这款车型出口的区域市场。

　　从产品本身看，撼路者与江铃原有消费群对接也不算困难。全顺的消费者大都是二三线城市的小企业，强调载物和越野能力的撼路者应该同样能满足它们的需求。

　　但正如彭波所说：“卖全顺，只要价格够实惠，消费者就会掏钱，而卖SUV，销售员的态度、服务质量都很重要。”

　　撼路者首发后的第二天，在上海市闵行区的上海九和汽车江铃4S店中，还看不到任何关于这辆车的介绍。

　　在大约是乘用车4S店一半面积的展厅里，经典款全顺和新一代全顺仍占据中心位置—这两款车依然是上个月的销量冠亚军。两名销售顾问正在向一位住在城郊的私营业主介绍两代全顺的差别。而展厅的另一边，驭胜的展车上则摆放着“全系降价6000元”的广告牌—江铃经销渠道目前的硬件和服务标准，似乎还无法与定价25万元以上的撼路者匹配。

　　江铃汽车总裁陈远清已经公布了渠道改造计划：未来，会增加40%的江铃经销商，并对已有经销商的服务流程进行升级，以符合全球乘用车销售流程上的规范，而全顺与撼路者的销售将由两个团队分别进行。

　　计划能否奏效，就要看经销商的执行力了。“过去几年，凭借全顺的热销，江铃的经销商得到了很多实惠，现在要卖更赚钱的乘用车了，它们应该有能力也有意愿进行升级。”彭波说。

　　目前，这款SUV还未正式公布售价，考虑到上市时间设定在明年，江铃和福特还有时间准备。

　　而对于长安福特和江铃福特这两个合作伙伴，福特称，将为它们制定“双赢的成长计划”。虽然并未透露计划的细节，但平衡两家合资公司利益的方式可能是产品线。“福特必须持续向两个合作伙伴投放足够多的车型。”Russo分析说。

　　罗礼祥曾说，福特目前在中国的首要目标是要保持“激进、富有雄心的增长”。

　　所以，对于福特来说，如何在长安福特和江铃福特的天平两端调整砝码，还并不是一个迫切的问题。目前，在中国市场作为追赶者的它，首要任务仍是不断地增加砝码—无论这些砝码增加到天平的哪一端。

China’s antitrust fines for foreign car companies fail to stall growth

The Financial Times, November 3, 2014

Trading up: premium vehicles cost almost twice as much as in the US

For multinational car companies operating in China, the euphoria from the biggest ever automotive boom in industrial history is finally being tempered by some unexpected risks, most notably a controversial investigation by the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) into allegedly anti-competitive behaviour by Audi, Mercedes-Benz and other brands.The investigations have so far resulted in fines that are peanuts in comparison to the vast profits that foreign automakers have enjoyed over recent years – and continue to enjoy.

In July, a joint venture between Volkswagen unit Audi and state-owned First Auto Works was ordered to pay $41m for alleged violations of China’s 2008 Anti-Monopoly Law. This compares with reported operating profits of $12.2bn for VW’s joint ventures in China (its other is with SAIC Motor) last year.

Fiat unit Chrysler was also hit with a small fine this summer, while Daimler’s joint venture with BAIC Motor, which makes Mercedes-Benz saloons, is still awaiting the outcome of an NDRC investigation after one of its Shanghai sales offices was raided in July.

These fines are the byproduct of a wide-ranging investigation that appears to have a much larger aim – forcing car companies, regardless of whether they are in fact guilty of anti-competitive practices, to lower the prices of their vehicles, spare parts and services.

According to one industry executive, the head of a multinational company’s China operations has told visiting board members that, in view of the NDRC’s offensive, his biggest fear is of a sudden shift in government policy. “It’s bad for business,” the executive says of the investigation. “It has made the investment environment very uncertain.

“If people can afford the cars, they can afford the spare parts and after-sales service,” he adds. “It’s not like the NDRC is lowering the price of medical care or making food cheaper.”

Foreign automobile executives argue that the relatively high prices asked for cars – especially premium vehicles that can be almost twice as expensive in China as they are in the US – is a function of unprecedented demand, even for overseas models subject to expensive import taxes.

China’s car craze began in earnest in 2008-09, during the depths of the global financial crisis, when it overtook the US as the world’s largest car market. 

Demand from entire generations of first-time drivers soared in the world’s second-largest economy, just as purchasing power collapsed in the US and Europe – a nadir symbolically marked by Washington’s bailout of General Motors in December 2008. 

Over the ensuing half decade, foreign carmakers in China, especially long established ones such as Volkswagen and GM, had a license to print money. 

Even last year, when double-digit annual growth was finally expected to taper, annual sales grew by about 15 per cent to 18m passenger cars – 10 times as many as were sold in India.

This year began in similar fashion, especially for foreign brands and their Chinese joint venture companies. Sales of Chinese brands, however, began to fall sharply and their share of the passenger car market tumbled from 27 per cent to 23 per cent.

The precipitous fall-off in sales of local brands and slower economic growth has forced the China Association of Automobile Manufacturers to lower its projection of an 8.3 per cent increase in year-on-year sales this year to 4.6 per cent – two-thirds down on last year.

In the first quarter, Geely, the private sector carmaker most famous for its purchase of Volvo Cars from Ford, saw sales of its own-brand vehicles fall by as much as 40 per cent over the same period a year earlier. 

This was despite a gradual improvement in the quality of local-brand cars in China, according to Geoff Broderick at JD Power, which publishes an annual customer survey of 212 models across 62 brands. “The domestic brands are doing exactly what they should be doing – focusing on quality,” Mr Broderick says. “But as we see the quality gap closing, we’re not seeing a pick-up in [local brands’] market share.”

Investigations have so far resulted in fines that are peanuts in comparison to the vast profits that foreign automakers continue to enjoy

One reason for the fall has been a counterintuitive NDRC requirement that foreign-invested joint ventures develop a local brand for the China market, such as the Baojun saloon manufactured by GM, SAIC and Wuling. Many of these new entrants are priced to compete against domestic rivals, especially in smaller cities where car ownership rates are relatively low.

“I don’t understand what the Chinese government’s objective was in encouraging foreign companies to create local brands,” says Bill Russo, a Shanghai-based industry consultant. 

“It only cannibalises already distressed sales of local brands. I think the intent was for more technology to be shared by the foreign companies. But the unintended consequence is to take volume from local carmakers producing similar products,” he adds.

At the other end of the spectrum, foreign carmakers continue to thrive in saturated markets such as Beijing and Shanghai, where premium brands such as Audi, BMW and Mercedes-Benz account for a quarter of the market. 

Even now, limits on expensive new licence plates to combat congestion and pollution are spurring their sales, as existing plate holders trade up.

“As cities implement plate restrictions, people gravitate towards premium foreign brands,” says Mr Russo. “They want to put their expensive plates on the best piece of automotive technology that they can.” 

Click here to read the article at FT.com

Jaguar Land Rover’s first China factory caps carmaker’s resurgence

The Financial Times, October 21, 2014

The opening of Jaguar Land Rover’s first China factory caps a five-year resurgence under Indian ownership that has made the Coventry-based company a byword for British manufacturing excellence and export prowess.

The new plant in Changshu, about a two-hour drive from Shanghai, marks a pivotal moment for JLR. The Tata Motors unit needs a manufacturing presence in China to consolidate its position in the world’s largest car market – but also wants to assure its British workforce and the UK government that international expansion will not jeopardise jobs at home.

As part of that effort, JLR is boosting investment at its factories in Liverpool and the West Midlands and this month opens a new £500m engine plant in Wolverhampton – even as it plans to open another manufacturing facility in Brazil. Last week, JLR’s factory in Halewood, Merseyside began producing the new Land Rover Discovery Sport after a £200m investment that created 250 new manufacturing jobs and £3.5bn in supplier contracts.

The Changshu factory, a Rmb10.8bn ($1.8bn) joint venture with state-owned Chery Automobile that opened on Tuesday, will produce JLR’s less expensive Range Rover Evoque for the China market, where the company sells almost five SUVs for every one Jaguar saloon. On Tuesday, JLR said that it also intended to produce a Jaguar saloon model at the factory by 2016.

“The demand that’s here in China will far outstrip [Changshu’s] capacity so we have absolutely zero plans to export any cars whatsoever,” Bob Grace, JLR’s China head, said at this year’s Beijing Auto Show.

Mr Grace hosted UK trade unionists in China at the outset of JLR’s investment programme in an effort to allay their fears. “You can imagine the thoughts that go through their mind when you open a factory in China,” he said.

“When you look at the competitive situation it doesn’t take long to realise that you have to build the cars in China as part of our global aspirations to be a fairly significant player.”
Roger Maddison, at UK union Unite, was one of JLR’s guests and says the union accepts the logic of the Changshu investment but has concerns about the longer-term trend it signals.

“Tata knows what differentiates JLR from other carmakers – it’s British,” says Pierluigi Bellini, analyst at IHS Automotive. “If they start developing cars in, say, India, it’s going to be a different brand image . . . Developing it from scratch – blank white paper to the final design – it’s important to keep that in the home market.”

Tata bought JLR from Ford in March 2008, a week after JPMorgan bought Bear Stearns. When Lehman Brothers went bankrupt six months later, the global financial crisis began in earnest and Ratan Tata, then chairman of the Indian group, had plenty of reasons to regret his purchase.

But the Indian provenance of JLR’s new owner hinted at the multinational nature of its future transformation, which would be built on surging demand in developing economies. The most important of these was China, whose emergence as the world’s largest car market coincided with the US government’s December 2008 bailout of General Motors.

“During the early part of 2009 we were pretty close to the wire as a business,” said Mr Grace. “But I used to come to China once a quarter and got a sense that something different was happening in this place . . . It’s almost a miracle that the [China] factory has come out of the ground in such a short period of time.” JLR’s joint venture with Chery was announced less than two years ago.

Bernstein Research predicts JLR will sell 130,000 vehicles in China this year, compared with 54,000 total units in 2009-2011. The Changshu factory’s initial annual production capacity is 130,000 vehicles but output is expected to ramp up gradually over the next few years.

“No other [carmaker] has benefited as much from China,” Max Warburton, senior analyst at Bernstein Research, wrote in a recent report. The country now accounts for a third of JLR’s total sales and, Mr Warburton estimates, more than half of its earnings before interest, tax and depreciation. In its latest quarter JLR posted pre-tax profit of £924m, on revenues of £5.35bn.

But the success has been driven by the Land Rover side of the company – in particular the Range Rover Evoque, a sporty 4x4. JLR sold more than 90,000 cars in China last year, but only 16,000 of these were Jaguars. The big three German brands – Audi, BMW and Mercedes-Benz – sold more than 1m. 

JLR joins the “big three” Germans as the fourth big premium carmaker to begin manufacturing operations in the world’s largest car market. Annual sales of premium vehicles, currently about 1.3m, are expected to reach 2.5m-3m units by 2020. But the Germans dominate the sector, with a combined market share of about 80 per cent. 

“There’s lots of opportunity for new premium entrants,” says Bill Russo, a Shanghai-based industry consultant. “The market is underserved. The German three alone can’t continue to maintain that kind of dominant market share. They can’t keep up with demand.”

JLR estimates that local manufacturing has allowed its German rivals to reduce prices by about 15 per cent on average, thanks to savings on import tariffs and other costs. The UK company, by contrast, has what Mr Warburton calls “the most egregious pricing in China”.

In response, Mr Grace says JLR has “worked quite closely with [Chinese regulators] in terms of reacting to the challenges they gave us [on pricing]. We more than met their requirements”. He adds: “We’re not setting the market price – we’re following the market price.”

JLR reduced prices on some Range Rover and Range Rover Sport models earlier this year in China, in response to a concerted campaign by the National Development and Reform Commission to drive down the pricing of vehicles and spare parts.

But the price differential between the same Land Rover models sold in China and other markets remains wide, with a top-end Range Rover selling for the equivalent of £85,400 in China and £44,000 in the US.

Click here to read the original article at FT.com 

How Connected Mobility Technology Is Driving The Future Of The Automotive Industry

GlobalBusinessProfessor.com

Click here to view the seminar given by Bill Russo

We are pleased to share with you a seminar on the topic Reinventing Mobility in the China Context: Building the Internet of Mobility & Related Smart Car Technologies. With the auto industry developments and the increasingly prevalence of the wireless internet and mobile devices, we expect that the Internet of Vehicles will create discontinuous opportunities for product and business model innovation.

We believe the conditions in China – the world's largest auto market and the market with the largest number of both internet and "smart phone" users – will likely make it the incubator for rapid commercialization of such innovations. China's urban transportation challenge, the high rate of adoption of connected mobile devices, combined with the rapid and aggressive introduction of alternative mobility and vehicle ownership concepts from new entrants, will ultimately compress the time needed to commercialize smart, connected car technologies and related services. Such developments will dramatically alter not just the feature content of vehicles, but may also usher in a revolution to the business model of the automotive industry – where a model focused on "users of mobility services" could emerge as a real alternative to the traditional model of "car ownership".


Click here to view the presentation slides

Click here to read the associated paper

为何戴姆勒搞不定克莱斯勒 菲亚特却能带着它上市 (Why the Chrysler Fiat Listing is Able to Work)

Jiemian.com, October 12, 2014

菲亚特与其美国公司克莱斯勒合并的决议将生效。而10月13日全新的菲亚特克莱斯勒汽车公司FCA（Fiat Chrysler Automobiles）的股票将正式以FCA为代码在纽约证券交易所上市交易。

新的菲亚特克莱斯勒汽车公司也将继续扩大销售额，并寻找潜在的联盟机会。扩大菲亚特汽车在中国等市场的份额将是这一进程的下一个重大步骤。

合并后的菲亚特克莱斯勒成为世界第七大车企，并计划整顿老旧的工厂和产品线，希望在销量上更加接近日本丰田汽车，美国通用汽车和德国大众集团这三大巨头。

菲亚特克莱斯勒汽车公司CEO塞尔吉奥·马尔乔内说：“（合并后）将有空间塑造一家比现在的汽车业领导者丰田更大的车企。”计划在2018年退休的马尔乔内为菲亚特克莱斯勒制定了五年规划，到2018年时公司的销售量相比2013年应该增长60%至每年700万辆。而丰田、通用及大众三家公司2013年的全球销量均在900万辆以上。

重组专家企业阿历克斯合伙公司的欧洲主管斯泰法诺·阿维萨（Stefano Aversa）说，菲亚特和克莱斯勒的合并以及新公司在美国的上市让62岁的马尔乔内有更多筹码来出售非核心业务，或者是达成更多联盟。他表示，“我不认为马尔乔内制定的是一个单一策略，应该是根据市场状况以及企业表现来执行的多重战略。公司在美国的上市给了他很多选择，这本身就是极有价值的。”

现年38岁的菲亚特集团主席约翰·艾尔坎（John Elkann）支持马尔乔内的决定。他表示：“我并不打算出售菲亚特的股权，尽管菲亚特与其它企业的合并将会导致阿涅利家族所持有的集团股份遭到稀释，但这会使菲亚特变得更加强大。”Exor SpA持有菲亚特集团30%股权，是意大利知名的阿涅利家族（Agnelli）资产。该集团目前正由艾尔坎执掌。

菲亚特在7月以4.75%的利率出售了8.5亿欧元债券。国际策略和投资公司的股权研究员在这次发债之后称，“我们想知道一家美国公司通过美元计价发行债券的成本将可以低多少。”报告称，菲亚特的财务状况和信用评价都使得这个问题存在疑虑。

评级机构标准普尔在伦敦的企业信用评级董事阿莱克斯·赫伯特（Alex Herbert）说，纽约上市本身不会改变菲亚特的信用评价，更重要的问题是：菲亚特什么时候能够拿到克莱斯勒集团的现金。菲亚特克莱斯勒目前计划在2016年对克莱斯勒的债券进行再融资，有望通过这一操作完全掌控克莱斯勒的现金储备。这笔现金在6月底的时候已经达到133亿美元。

克莱斯勒是美国著名汽车公司，曾与通用、福特并称美国三大汽车公司。1998年，德国戴姆勒-奔驰汽车公司和克莱斯勒公司合并，是历史上汽车制造业最大的一起合并。戴姆勒-克莱斯勒公司成为当时全美第二大汽车生产商、世界第五大汽车公司。

2007年戴姆勒克莱斯勒公司宣称因止不住长期亏损将子公司克莱斯勒集团80.1%的股权出售给私人资本运营商Cerberus Capital Management L.P.。曾轰动一时的跨文化合并就此走到了尽头。2009年，克莱斯勒宣布破产，由美国政府和菲亚特共同接手。直至今年年初，菲亚特正式完成对克莱斯勒的并购，两家公司合并。

德国汽车界业内人士分析认为，梅塞德斯-奔驰与克莱斯勒的结合有先天的缺陷和后天的不足。由于欧美的文化差异，双方在管理方法和管理作风上截然不同；同时存在战略决策失误。根据美国人喜欢庞大舒适轿车的特点，克莱斯勒开发的皮卡车和SUV一度备受欢迎，而2005年石油价格增长令美国人环保意识加强，克莱斯勒的库存开始大量积压，公司不得不把产量削减，并关闭了克莱斯勒在美国的多家工厂。

前克莱斯勒东北亚负责人、高风咨询公司董事总经理Bill Russo对界面记者表示：“文化差异并不是戴姆勒克莱斯勒分家的关键原因。一家豪华汽车企业（戴姆勒奔驰）与一个大众品牌（克莱斯勒）合并在一起本身就阻碍了合并后协作效应产生作用。”

Bill Russo说：“戴姆勒克莱斯勒遇到的问题将不会在菲亚特克莱斯勒身上重演，两家公司都是大众品牌汽车公司，合并后将共享技术和生产平台从而增加产品的范围。管理层也更加具有对并购公司的管理经验。克莱斯勒将获得小型轿车的生产平台和零部件技术，特别是动力系统。而菲亚特也可以借此打入北美市场。”

一名与菲亚特克莱斯勒汽车公司关系密切的投资银行家说：“塞尔吉奥·马尔乔内非常迫切地希望菲亚特不再被视作一家意大利企业，他希望完全撤出意大利，但是他也知道这在政治上不可能。他能做的只是逐渐离开，这也是本次美国上市的主要意义。”

无论菲亚特还是克莱斯勒，进军中国时机都不算晚，但都以失败告终。马尔乔内也曾坦言：“菲亚特曾在中国市场存在决策错误。在当时，试图用落后的平台，落后的技术，落后的车型进入中国市场，我们当时完全没有了解中国消费者的预期和需求，也没有洞察中国市场和消费者的快速变化。”

菲亚特克莱斯勒合并后调整战略，重新进入中国市场。目前，菲亚特克莱斯勒与广汽集团合作，已经发布了菲翔、致悦等菲亚特品牌车辆，以及Jeep品牌车辆。今年菲亚特克莱斯勒在华销量也在持续增长，1至8月份，菲亚特克莱斯勒在华销量为9.82万辆汽车，与2013年同期相比攀升了55.7%。

Bill Russo to Join Panel Discussion at Global Automotive Forum

Wuhan, China, October 16, 2014

TOPIC:

The Transformation of China’s Auto Dealers

Auto dealers in China thrive on new car sales and highly profitable repair services. What opportunities and challenges do dealers face with the growing number of vehicles on the road, increased competition, the internet, and the establishment of more independent repair shop chains?

• Relationship between e-commerce through the internet and the current sales channels.
• Transformation from a “commodity economy” to a “customer economy” by applying big data technology.
• Standardization of the used car market.

Hu Bo, Chief Marketing Officer, Greater China and the ASEAN regional, Volkswagen

Liu Zhifeng, Executive Deputy General Manager of Beijing Hyundai, China Group ChinaChina

Pang Qinghua, Chairman of Pangda Group, China

Bill Russo, Managing Director with Gao Feng Advisory Company, China

Moderated by,

Ma Xiaowei, President of Iautos.cn, China