3.30.2010

Making the Geely and Volvo Marriage A Success

March 30, 2010

by Bill Russo

Zhejiang Geely Automotive Group's $1.8 billion acquisition of Volvo from Ford represents the most ambitious action to date for a Chinese vehicle manufacturer to accelerate the process of transforming into a global automotive player. Li Shufu has described the deal as the “poor boy from the countryside” (Geely) marrying the “rich girl from the city” (Volvo). Like all wedding ceremonies, Sunday’s deal signing in Gothenburg, Sweden could be described as a celebration of hope and love for the newlyweds.

Sharing the Same Bed, Having Different Dreams

It is a marriage of two automotive companies with very dissimilar backgrounds and histories. The Chinese describe partners with different agendas as “sharing the same bed, but having different dreams”. I have already commented about the sound industrial logic for this deal in my article Ford’s Sale of Volvo to Geely Benefits All Parties, however this only provides the foundation. Building a successful partnership between Volvo and Geely will require a solid plan for post-acquisition integration.

It should be noted that the Volvo acquisition is not Geely’s first cross-border deal. In 2006, Geely partnered with Manganese Bronze to produce components for and assemble London Taxi vehicles. On March 17, 2010 Geely announced plans to become the majority shareholder of Manganese Bronze. In May 2009, Geely acquired the Australian gearbox maker Drivetrain Systems International.

Geely is clearly using an “inorganic” approach to accelerate its development and to improve its ability to compete in the China auto market. The learning applied here could also accelerate its emergence as a global automotive player. However, it is well known that cross-border deals rarely deliver on their initial promise.

Lessons Learned from Failed Automotive Marriages

We are witnessing a historic period in the development of the global automotive industry. The global financial crisis has dramatically weakened the “triad” markets (Western Europe, North America and Japan), and has highlighted the resilience of the emerging markets, led by China. The resultant economic “imbalance” creates opportunities for structural realignment of the industry as assets shift to the higher growth markets.

Clearly there is a need, on the part of the European and North American vehicle manufacturers and suppliers, to find additional sources of funding in order to keep their operations going, while the rapid growth of China’s auto market in recent years has provided Chinese companies with more capacity to invest. However, there are real challenges in making cross-border deals work.

For example, SAIC’s recent acquisition of Ssangyong was fraught with difficulty. The two companies had “different dreams” in terms of what they wanted out of a partnership, and they were not successful. SAIC was: unable to secure concessions from Ssangyong’s labor union to lower costs, unwilling to inject billons of RMB incremental capital to fund the business, and unable to manage the loss of leadership at Ssangyong. Ultimately, SAIC decided to dissolve the deal.

Even the more successful partnerships have had mixed results: by all measures, the Ford alliance with Mazda has been a very good example of a successful cross-border alliance. Ford benefited from access to Mazda’s fuel-efficient technologies and platforms, and both sides benefited from a shared global production and distribution footprint. However, Ford recently made the decision to liquidate its shares in Mazda in order to raise much-needed cash.

One of the most famous cases was the failed 9-year marriage of Daimler-Benz and Chrysler. Announced to the world in 1998 as a $38 billion “merger of equals”, the deal was ultimately dissolved in 2007.

The causes of failure for this deal are noteworthy:



1. Strategic Mis-Alignment: While each company had a sound rationale for partnership, there was a lack of alignment between the architects of the deal and the organizations they led. Juergen Schrempp was seeking to build scale and elevate the prominence of the automotive business in the Daimler-Benz portfolio of companies. Bob Eaton was seeking to expand Chrysler’s global reach beyond its core North American market. While on the surface it appeared compatible, this vision lacked sufficient top-down direction needed to build a globally integrated automotive enterprise. The target for achieving “synergy” resulting from achievement of a cost-savings target became the sole objective of the post-merger integration team, and meaningful integration of the core automotive business was never established as a concrete target.



2. Brand Tension: The brands of Daimler and Chrysler do not overlap, however the struggle over brands cut to the heart of the merger integration challenge. In many ways, the brands of a company define the image and aspirations of both its customers as well as its companies. For this reason, the idea of sharing any product, technology, or even resources used in the development or distribution of the product was viewed as a risk of compromising the value proposition of the brands. Daimler was concerned that a direct association with Chrysler would damage the Mercedes-Benz “premium” image. Chrysler was concerned that Daimler’s higher cost structure would make Chrysler’s mass-market brands less cost competitive.



3. Lack of Core Business Integration: The “Chrysler Group” essentially became a division within Daimler-Benz, which was renamed “DaimlerChrysler AG” in November 1998. The only functions that were integrated were the Financial Services division and several corporate staffs including Human Resources, IT, and Corporate Finance. Staff reductions in these functions accounted for much of the “Synergy” of the merger. The core business functions were left unchanged. As a result, the complex decisions of how to share development costs, develop new technologies, share product platforms, cross-load manufacturing plants, and combine marketing and sales functions were completely avoided. As a result, the automotive businesses failed to realize any benefits from the partnership.



4. Brain Drain: It is often stated that the majority of senior leaders of an acquired company leave within a two-year period after the merger. While efforts were made to retain Chrysler’s top leadership, it became very difficult once it became clear that this was never actually a “merger of equals”. Starting with Bob Eaton’s decision to step down as co-CEO, the leadership "flight" at Chrysler accelerated. Within two years, a significant percentage of Chrysler’s top 100 managers had left the company. While it may be difficult to avoid completely, it is critical to plan for the retention of the key leadership, or company performance and employee morale will suffer.



5. Culture Shock: This issue is often mistakenly attributed to differences in language, culture between Germans and Americans. However, this is not the root cause. The challenge is to achieve a true understanding of the respective needs of each partner. This tends to get oversimplified by assuming that language and culture are the problems. Language and cultural misunderstanding creates “resistance” and adds friction among the partners – which makes it difficult to develop a common understanding, but this is not the most fundamentally challenging issue. If this were the case, it would be impossible to explain why similar problems occur when companies merge within the same country. The most difficult issue is to establish a common understanding of what each partner wants out of the relationship – and finding a way to work with that.



Businesses hoping to grow “inorganically” would be wise to learn the lessons from the causes of the failed DaimlerChrysler merger.

Living The Dream: The Immediate Challenges

As a result of the shift of the automotive center of gravity to the east, there is a need to make these cross-border marriages work. A Chinese company investing in foreign assets must understand how to align the interests of the partner in the transaction with their own, or they will likely end up owning assets without the technological development know-how that went into creating those assets.

It all should start with a comprehensive risk-assessment and plan for post-acquisition integration. The key elements of this plan were noted in the article The Path to Globalization of China’s Automotive Industry.

Beyond this, Geely must overcome several other challenges in order to turn around Volvo’s operations. Geely must address the following issues:

1. Strategic Alignment and Governance. Bridging the huge gap between Volvo's traditional European (and some would argue “Scandinavian”) management mode and Geely's dynamic family business mode. This may be the largest challenge for Li Shufu in achieving “synergy” among the automotive units. This will be particularly challenging as Chairman Li has committed to keep independence of Volvo operations.

2. Cost Structure. Since Volvo maintains their current business structure, processes and supply base, it is impossible for Geely to realize the highest benefits of localization for Volvo cars even if they build a new production base in China in the near future. Geely may need to subsidize the Volvo global operation with the very thin margins generated from Geely’s local brand operations, which poses high risk and places pressure on Geely’s working capital.

3. Market Positioning. Geely faces a number of product portfolio and platform decisions regarding Volvo product offerings for China and the global markets. The manufacturing agreement with Chang’An Ford for the Volvo S40 and S80's will need to be addressed and Geely has already stated an objective of building a 300,000-unit production base in China. To achieve this, Volvo products would need to be repositioned in order to serve a mass-market instead of merely following the luxury-market leader Audi.

Marrying Volvo was an ambitious move for a "poor boy from the countryside" with only a little more than a decade of automotive experience. The automotive world is now closely watching to see if they can make it work.

With proper attention to the process of post-acquisition integration, and by addressing the immediate challenges noted here, Geely could indeed use the Volvo acquisition to accelerate the process of transforming itself into a global automotive player.

Click here to view the article published at Gasgoo.com's China Automotive News


3.29.2010

Dialogue: Recalls and Toyota's Challenges

March 28, 2010, CCTV-International

Interview with Bill Russo of Synergistics Limited, and Yoichi Shimatsu Former Editor of Japan Times which aired on China Central Television.

Dialogue 10/03/28 Recalls and Toyota's Challenges




3.28.2010

Russo Says Geely's Volvo Sales Target `Very Challenging'

Bloomberg Network's Asia Morning Call, March 28, 2010

March 29 (Bloomberg) -- Bill Russo, president of Synergistics, talks with Bloomberg's Susan Li about Zhejiang Geely Holding Co.'s agreement to buy Volvo Cars from Ford Motor Co. for $1.8 billion in the biggest overseas acquisition by a Chinese automaker. Yesterdays agreement includes terms on intellectual property rights, supply as well as research and development arrangements Geely said. (Source: Bloomberg)


Man in the News: Li Shufu

Financial Times, March 26, 2010

Shufu

If the west has lost confidence in itself during the financial crisis, it is clear where some of the old can-do spirit has ended up: in China. Li Shufu, whose automaking group Geely will soon be the proud new owner of Volvo, personifies this burgeoning surplus in self-assurance.

On Sunday Mr Li’s company is scheduled to sign one of China’s highest-profile takeovers of a foreign brand at a ceremony in Volvo’s hometown of Gothenburg. With Xi Jinping, China’s vice-president, in likely attendance, Geely – China’s largest private carmaker – will agree to pay Ford Motor $1.8bn (€1.3bn, £1.2bn) for the producer of famously solid estate cars and executive sedans.

In Volvo, Mr Li will be taking on a carmaker with revenues about five times Geely’s and a European premium brand that he himself admits he can tamper with only at its peril. The deal will be a bellwether for China’s ambitions to add supremacy in global automaking to its newly won title as the world’s largest vehicle market.

The 47-year-old Mr Li is just the kind of larger-than-life character to act as the figurehead for a new age of carmaking with Chinese characteristics. “He says ‘Why not’ while the rest of the world is asking ‘why’,” says Bill Russo, former head of Chrysler in China and head of Synergistics, an auto consultancy. “He is the kind of story that exists in China today, that existed in the west 100 years ago”. Mr Russo mentions Carnegies and Rockefellers, not Henry Ford. But associates say Mr Li savours the irony of helping out the company Ford created.




3.10.2010

Panel Discussion: "Toyota-gate"

China Radio International, March 10, 2010

As embattled Japanese auto giant Toyota launched a broad counter-attack on Monday aimed at refuting research that suggests electronics may be at the heart of runaway acceleration problems that have led the automaker to recall more than 8 million vehicles, there were reports of a runaway Prius on a California highway. The company just doesn’t seem able to catch a break – but do they deserve one?


Bill Russo, President of Synergistics Limited

Klaus Paur, Regional Director Automotive North Asia of TNS Research International China

Waldemar A. Pfoertsch, Professor of Marketing, China Europe International Business School

Click here for a link to the broadcast at CRIEnglish.com


3.09.2010

China needs time to build global car brand

Financial Times, March 9, 2010

By Patti Waldmeir in Beijing

Wang Fengying peeks into the room where the video cameras are waiting for her – and then runs down the hall, trailing public relations people, in search of a place to change her dress.

Ms Wang, 40, is the chief executive of the first Chinese car company to win approval to sell its cars throughout the European Union.

As the centre of gravity of the global car industry shifts to the East – with the emergence of China last year as the world’s largest auto market – this is a woman to be reckoned with in an industry dominated by men.

Her company, Great Wall Motor Company, is a leading seller of that quintessential boy’s toy, the sport utility ve

But Great Wall aims to be more than a peddler of off-road status symbols. It is jockeying for position as the next Hyundai – an Asian exporter of good cars at cheap prices.

In 2008, Great Wall sold nearly half its vehicles overseas (30 per cent last year due to the financial crisis). Ms Wang aims to sell 600,000 vehicles overseas by 2015, out of total forecast production of 1.8m; and she has already expanded beyond SUVs to small cars.

The Western auto industry, its confidence shaken by the global economic crisis, is watching companies such as Great Wall very closely.

Chinese carmakers are still a generation behind the West, but catching up quickly. Analysts say that alternative fuel technology could allow Chinese carmakers to leapfrog the internal combustion generation altogether.

Which Chinese company will be the first to break into the top ranks of global carmakers?

Geely, the independent car company that will shortly buy Volvo from Ford?BYD, the Warren Buffett-backed carmaker that plans to export electric cars to the US this year? SAIC, the state-owned powerhouse? Or could it be Great Wall, which is quietly laying the groundwork for a push into Europe?

Ms Wang advocates the notion that before you sell cars, you have to prove they are worth buying. So she has focused on the lengthy process of getting the EU’s prestigious Whole Vehicle Type approval for four Great Wall models, which permits sales throughout the internal market.

However, she does not think that even such a badge of quality will overcome consumer suspicion of brand China.

“Many consumers around the world have doubts about products made in China,” she says, acknowledging that it scarcely helps to come from a country famous for selling poisoned baby milk.

Such candour endears her to business partners and foreign rivals.

Suppliers say she pays her bills on time (a simple virtue not shared by some competitors), while industry insiders value her lack of bluster.

Great Wall “aims before they fire the gun”, says Bill Russo, head of auto consultancy Synergistics and former head of Chrysler in China.

“Many Chinese auto companies dream beyond their capabilities and there is something to be said for that ... But Great Wall is different: if they are talking about it, they have already done it.”

Ms Wang, who is a delegate at this week’s National People’s Congress in Beijing, says the government must help overcome China’s brand handicap. It must set minimum standards for the “made in China” label. No longer a badge of infamy, made in China must become synonymous with quality.

“People know that Switzerland is famous for its watch industry and Japan is known for manufacturing. China ought to start focusing on the brand building of Chinese automakers,” she says. However, Ms Wang has no illusions that it will be quick or easy to establish her brand in Europe. “Chinese auto brands are not established in those areas. For a product without branding, progress will be slow,” she says.

At a time when many Chinese business people display self-confidence that the country has emerged almost unscathed from the economic crisis, Ms Wang is not predicting that China will take over the automotive world anytime soon.

“Chinese auto companies will need 20 years to become famous in international markets,” says Ms Wang.

They may not take as long as Toyota did – and they will study the Japanese carmaker’s mistakes in the current recall crisis – but building a global automotive powerhouse will take “longer than the outside world thinks”, she says.

Video interview: www.ft.com/greatwall

click here to view the article at FT.com

3.04.2010

丰田:这一战为名誉 - 专访博斯公司高级顾问罗威(Bill Russo)

Gasgoo.com China Automotive News, March 4, 2010
  • 作者:Sophie Lu 来源:盖世汽车网 发布时间:2010年03月04日
    • 引子:丰田在美国市场引发一系列召回事件之后,从丰田章男主动到中国市场道歉和说明情况的举动,可以看到丰田正在显著加速危机处理速度。对于此次丰田召回事件,盖世汽车网特意采访了博斯公司的高级顾问罗威(Bill Russo)先生,他认为丰田当务之急是重拾将之前引以为傲的质量品牌。

      博斯公司高级顾问罗威(Bill Russo)

      盖世汽车网:您认为造成这次丰田大规模召回的原因是什么?是否是价值链管理体系方面的问题?如果是的话,具体是什么问题?

      罗威:丰田汽车出现加速器问题的根本原因仍在调查中,但丰田最流行的几款车型中存在的类似问题更像整个系统的设计中存在的一些固有缺陷。应该指出的是,这只是丰田最近公布的几个质量缺陷中的一个,这说明丰田并不只是一个部门或只是供应链管理体系出了问题,而可能是更综合性的问题。丰田以一种不可持续的速度过快扩张,并为此牺牲质量承诺,最终导致出现召回汽车数超过8百万辆的无奈局面。

      丰田前任领导提出的争取全球市场15%份额的目标成为丰田集团的首要目标,也导致了丰田对质量要求的大意。由于过分追逐市场份额,丰田不惜在巨大风险压力下拿产品开发作赌注,使得诸多质量问题接踵而至。

      盖世汽车网:您认为此次大规模召回对丰田目前和将来发展有何影响?

      罗威:这次召回涉及丰田在美国的8款最受欢迎的车型(可占其在美国销量的一半)。至于具体的直接销售损失,丰田在美国一月份的销量下降16%,即表明2010年的汽车总销量将缩减约30万辆。而这次召回将使2010年丰田的全球销量减少500,000多辆。当然,丰田除了召回本身的损失,其产量与产值也遭遇了大幅下降,预估损失约合20亿美元。

      这次召回事件的危机阴霾可能远不止数字上的损失,更惨重的代价可能是人们对丰田质量与可靠性的公信力的摧毁,对丰田来说这无疑是一场刻骨铭心的挑战。而对丰田来说,当务之急便是重塑它们为之奋斗几十年才建立起来的信誉。人们常说信任源于一生的不懈倾注,但顷刻之间也能毁于一旦。召回事件给丰田带来了一系列的毁灭性的质量溃败的打击,丰田在全球顾客心目中的品牌形象与信心势必需要艰苦重建。

      丰田很多经营管理原则和实践曾被全球汽车业奉为圭皋,现在则遭到怀疑。比如,丰田在整个产品系列中使用通用件的做法,已成为汽车业的一个惯例,但现在却成为导致丰田的召回危机扩大的因素。另外,召回也显示出了诊断机电系统故障原因的繁复程度,以及对更有效的问题识别和解决流程的欠缺。

    盖世汽车网:丰田现正积极行动,采取一系列措施挽回这次召回造成的消极影响。您如何评价丰田为此做出反应与处理方案?

    罗威:丰田必须采取明确措施将经营重点回归到提供高品质汽车上来。丰田必须通过这次危机表现出其对消费者的承诺及其发现问题根源并消除问题的能力。这些问题,不仅是表面的加速器等产品问题,也包括将经营重点错误地放在了追逐超速发展上。

    丰田召回事件对其他汽车企业而言则是一个机会,他们可以借此契机将曾经的丰田忠实用户争取过来。而丰田用户由此遭受的最实际影响是汽车残余价值可能下降,进而造成汽车月租费的直接下挫。这也使其它品牌在顾客比较各品牌车的整体拥有成本时更具竞争力,而这个成本曾是丰田汽车长期以来的核心竞争力。

    然而,危机对一个公司来说恰是一个关键性时刻;因为在危机时刻,高级领导层可以以此为契机向人们展示公司秉承的永恒价值。丰田能够通过这次危机向世人证明对消费者的承诺以及其发现问题根源并消除问题的能力。通过及时采取适当举措,丰田可以挽留住顾客的信任度,并从这次危机中全身而退。尽管丰田在发现问题严重性方面确实存在滞后,但它最近已采取积极行动来抑制不良影响,而其品牌能否重新赢得人们的信赖,仍尚待分晓。

    (文章来源:盖世汽车网)

    click here to view the original interview posted on Gasgoo.com's China Automotive News